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It is commonplace to observe that digital technologies
facilitate our access to information on a scale unimaginable
in previous eras, leading many to call this the “Information
Age.” The vaunted advantages of unprecedented data flow
obscure a dark corollary: the more modes of engaging with
data are available to a people, the more modes are available
for manipulating them. Whether through social media, blogs,
email, newspaper headlines, or doctored images and videos,
the public is indeed bombarded by information, and much of
it is misleading or outright false. Much of it, in fact, is
propaganda. As the methods for manipulating mass
audiences continue to multiply, a clear understanding of the
concept of propaganda has never been more relevant.
This Article constructs a precise, novel account of
propaganda, incorporating notable scholarly insights into
the concept as well as the overlooked lessons of the law’s
fragmented efforts to regulate it. To bring this new
theoretical framework into focus and demonstrate its
importance in the Information Age, the Article connects the
underlying theory to contemporary communications
practices, many of which are enhanced by the availability of
new technology. Notably, in doing so, the Article also
develops the first systematic account of political gaslighting,
which properly understood (and counterintuitively, perhaps)
constitutes a form of propaganda.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2017, Sean Spicer made his debut as the
first White House Press Secretary of the Trump
Administration.1 He gave a peculiar and memorable
performance, tearing into the press for its coverage of
President Trump’s inauguration, which had taken place the
day before.2 Spicer was particularly incensed at press reports
that highlighted the size of the crowd that attended the
inauguration, taking exception to the suggestion that it was
visibly smaller than the crowd that attended President
Obama’s first inauguration in 2009.3 Photographs taken
from comparable angles plainly show much larger crowds
amassed in 2009, and Washington Metro ridership records
align with the photographs.4 Nevertheless, against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, Spicer angrily insisted
that President Trump’s inauguration featured “‘the largest
audience ever to witness an inauguration’ in person and in
the world.”5 Not only that, but reporting to the contrary was
“shameful and wrong,” an attempt “to minimize the
enormous support” for President Trump.6
Although Spicer would later express regret at his
handling of the briefing,7 his brazen dishonesty introduced
the world to a style of communication that came to

1. Elle Hunt, Trump’s Inauguration Crowd: Sean Spicer’s Claims Versus the
Evidence, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jan/22/trump-inauguration-crowd-sean-spicers-claims-versus-theevidence.
2. See generally id. (referring to Spicer’s “blistering debut” in the role on
January 21, 2017, noting his “briefing room tirade[,]” and showing photographs
from President Trump’s inauguration dated January 20, 2017).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Abigail Abrams, ‘I Screwed Up’: Sean Spicer Says He Regrets Comments
on Inauguration Crowd Size and Hitler, TIME (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:35 PM),
https://time.com/5088900/sean-spicer-screwed-up-inauguration-hitler/.
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characterize the Trump administration.8 Perhaps the most
notable characteristic of this style includes a willingness to
state and re-state demonstrably false propositions about a
wide range of topics—not just stretching the truth here and
there, or falling back on contested claims, but actively,
consistently, and angrily contradicting the historical record.
It is a practice that many commentators now refer to,
somewhat loosely, as “gaslighting.”9 But it also evokes echoes
of the more venerable concept of propaganda, albeit without
insidious subtlety.
Both “gaslighting” and “propaganda” are difficult to
define, and thus the relationship between the two concepts
is murky at best. As described below, “gaslighting” is a
relatively new term. For most of its short history, it has
captured certain forms of interpersonal manipulation, where
it was never the subject of legal regulation per se. The term
“gaslighting” has only recently found its way into the
political domain—controversially at that—and it has never
been systematically theorized in the political context.
Propaganda, on the other hand, has been the subject of
significant attention, both in the law and in scholarly work—
so much so that it has splintered into competing variants of
divergent meaning and moral valence. The fragmented
efforts at legal regulation of propaganda both reflect and
reinforce the confusion about what it is and why it should, at
least at times, be subject to restrictions under the law.
Nevertheless, the term “propaganda” continues to perform
heavy work in contemporary political and legal discourse.
Often undefined, the term routinely appears in media
reports about persuasive messaging campaigns, and it
typically carries a vague but decidedly negative connotation

8. See Megan Garber, The First Lie of the Trump Presidency, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 13,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/theabsurdity-of-donald-trumps-lies/579622/ (“In his inaugural appearance as White
House press secretary, Sean Spicer set the tone for the next two years.”).
9. See infra Section II.A.
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of illegality or other impropriety.10 Scholars have offered
numerous engagements with the concept that help
illuminate its possible meanings, but most such accounts are
historical, relatively general in nature, or focus on a specific
variety of propaganda.11
Responding in part to calls from human rights bodies to
develop public understanding of propaganda and
misinformation in the media,12 this Article demonstrates the
need for a comprehensive and clear definition of propaganda
and then satisfies that need. Part I of this Article identifies
10. See, e.g., Christian Davenport, Trump campaign pulls ad about SpaceX
launch after former astronaut calls it political propaganda, WASH. POST (June 5,
2020, 2:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/05/trumpcampaign-nasa-ad-pulled/ (quoting a former astronaut displeased about
President Trump’s reelection campaign using footage featuring her and her son,
calling the video “political propaganda”); Anna Fifield, China is waging a global
propaganda war to silence critics abroad, report warns, WASH. POST (Jan. 15,
2020, 7:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-iswaging-an-aggressive-propaganda-campaign-to-distort-media-landscape-reportwarns/2020/01/15/30fd4d58-374a-11ea-a1ff-c48c1d59a4a1_story.html (utilizing
the term “propaganda” to refer to a public relations campaign by China that may
lead to “corrosive effects on public debate”).
11. See generally, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT (Pantheon Books, 1988) (arguing that the mass media
has historically operated on a “propaganda model,” misleading the public and
defending powerful interests); RANDAL MARLIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF
PERSUASION 5–11 (2d ed. 2013) (quoting a variety of fairly general definitions of
the term); JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS XIII (2015) (focusing on
political propaganda defined “as the employment of a political ideal against
itself[,]” rather than the concept of propaganda in its broader, classical sense).
12. See generally Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint Declaration on
Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda, ¶ 6(a),
U.N. Doc. FOM.GAL/3/17 (Mar. 3, 2017) (adopting the joint declaration, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the
Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information called on “[a]ll stakeholders – including intermediaries, media
outlets, civil society and academia – [to] be supported in developing participatory
and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of
disinformation and propaganda on democracy, freedom of expression, journalism
and civic space, as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena”).
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the necessary and sufficient conditions for labeling a
communication propagandistic (in a comprehensive but
pejorative sense); distinguishes various moral and functional
levels on which that label may operate; and charts the
concept graphically to demonstrate the relationships
between some of its different instantiations. I will call this
model the “comprehensive account of propaganda.” To
develop this novel account, Part I begins in a fashion
uncommon among scholarly engagements: it systematically
collects and analyzes notable instances of the legal
regulation of propaganda, focusing on international law and
domestic federal law from the United States. Even within
those limited domains, the law’s approach to propaganda is
muddled, yet the Article identifies genuine, hidden insights
in the law and combines them with significant scholarly
contributions of the past to build a compelling new account.
In Part II, the Article demonstrates the contemporary
significance of propaganda—and the need to understand it
as a form of communication—by applying the comprehensive
account to myriad communications practices of legal and
political significance today. Most notably, the Article offers
(so far as I know) the first effort to develop a rigorous and
sophisticated theoretical account of political gaslighting
before clearly illuminating the reasons for which political
gaslighting amounts to propaganda. Notably, the fact that
political gaslighting rises to the level of propaganda explains
in large part why it is objectionable. The Article also connects
the new model of propaganda to astroturfing, crocodile tears,
doctored photographs and videos, hacking and selective
leaking, and other phenomena of contemporary political and
legal significance. In doing so, the Article underscores a
growing (if justified) cost of our storied commitment to
freedom of expression, and lays the groundwork for a clear,
principled, and focused discussion of the settings in which
propaganda ought to be regulated.
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DEFINING “PROPAGANDA”

The concept of propaganda has received significant
scholarly attention over the past several decades, often from
a historical perspective.13 It has also featured heavily in
certain influential works of fiction over that same span.14 At
the most general level, the term refers to a particular form of
persuasive communication, but consensus dissipates beyond
that point. “Propaganda” has been defined in numerous
different ways15 and, perhaps more confounding, is often
deployed without a definition attached at all. In the latter
instances, the term threatens to function primarily as an
insult directed at the content of another’s speech rather than
its mode or method. As to the former, some of the definitions
or uses are morally neutral and even favorable, whereas
others—perhaps most—are decidedly negative. Notably,
divergent and undefined uses of the term arise not just in
scholarship and political commentary, but also in the law
itself. As explored in more detail below, the term
“propaganda” appears without meaningful definition at
points in international human rights law and international
humanitarian law. It also appears in a variety of contexts in
U.S. federal law—again, sometimes defined and sometimes
not. These uses have not been adequately accounted for in
analyses of the concept of propaganda.
Untangling the welter of uses and definitions requires
deliberation, but it is valuable because the concept of
propaganda is widely used in the law and in public
commentary, and because the term can have significant
freestanding analytic value. Depending on the definition we

13. See MARLIN, supra note 11, at 4–13 (identifying numerous scholars who
have worked on the concept).
14. See, e.g., RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (Simon & Schuster 2012) (1953);
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Everyman’s Library 2013) (1932); GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classics 1961) (1949).
15. See MARLIN, supra note 11, at 4–11 (collecting definitions from a variety
of thinkers).
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adopt, propagandistic practices may well date back to
ancient history.16 The term “propaganda” itself likely
originated more recently, but nevertheless dates back at
least to the 16th century, when the Pope created the Sacred
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith—originally to
resist the Reformation, but thereafter to support Catholic
missionary efforts.17 (In Latin, the name is Sacra
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide.18) In that religious context,
the term carried a positive connotation for those operating
under the label, referring to the dissemination of ideas that
the Congregation believed to be both true and of
extraordinary significance.19
Although there is a long history of other positive uses of
the term, including some relatively recent ones,20 the term
has now acquired a negative connotation, at least in Englishspeaking countries.21 It is now often associated, for example,
16. See id. at 36–45 (describing instances from ancient Greece and Rome).
17. See id. at 4 (describing the arc of the name).
18. Id.
19. By contrast, others with conflicting and deeply-held religious convictions
may well have regarded the term negatively. See id. (noting that the Protestant
response to these Catholic efforts may have prompted a negative association with
the term).
20. See STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 37 (“For the average person,
the word ‘propaganda’ has evil and malicious overtones. Propaganda is
considered something used by the demagogue to spread evil ideologies. Because
of the high state of development that propaganda has reached in totalitarian
nations, it is readily dismissed as something to be condemned and avoided. But
propaganda does not have to be evil. There is a noble sense in which propaganda
can be used. Remember that the term originated in the Catholic Church.”
(quoting Martin Luther King’s “Propagandizing Christianity” sermon)); id. at 38
(describing W.E.B. Du Bois’s call to African American artists to deploy
propaganda, which Stanley interprets as “emotional appeals to win the respect,
empathy, and understanding of whites”); see also MARLIN, supra note 11 at 10–11
(quoting Brendan Bracken and John Grierson expressing favorable views of
propaganda).
21. See MARLIN, supra note 11, at 4 (“There is a strong association, in Englishspeaking countries, between the word ‘propaganda’ and the ideas of lying or
deception[.] . . . Politicians and bureaucrats generally avoid using the term to
describe their own activities, tending to reserve it for those of their opponents.”);
see also STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 38 (“In English, the word
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with the efforts of the Third Reich to demonize Jews and
other minorities in the 1930s and 1940s.22 A relevant account
of the term “propaganda” must account for the negative
connotation the term has undeniably acquired. Moreover, to
maximize its analytic value, it would be ideal to derive an
objective, negative definition, one that can pick out certain
problematic communication practices themselves rather
than functioning merely as a pejorative description of
disfavored messages. In other words, if possible, the term
should attach to communication of a certain form or type
rather than being defined according to the ideology of
communication content. If “propaganda” merely refers to
expressions of viewpoints that a particular speaker rejects,
then the term will simply stand in for her unstated objections
to the substance of the message in question. The proper use
of the term would then be rendered both indexical and ad
hominem by definition.
Moreover, once we separate the mode of communication
from (dis)approval of its content, the divergent valence of
various uses of “propaganda” come into focus. One can
approve both of a mode of communication and its content;
disapprove of both the mode and its content; favor the mode
and disfavor its content; or disfavor its mode but favor its
content. These various configurations can explain the
possibility of people adopting favorable attitudes toward the
concept of propaganda, even if we define the term objectively
and negatively. For example, one who prioritizes above all
persuading an audience of a particular viewpoint may see
the ends of doing so as justifying problematic
communicational means, thus being unmoved by allegations
of trafficking in propaganda.23
‘propaganda’ has acquired a pejorative connotation.”)
22. See, e.g., David Welch, History: Nazi Propaganda, BBC (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nazi_propaganda_gallery.shtml
(“The story of the Nazi rise to power in the Germany of the 1930s is often seen as
a classic example of how to achieve political ends through propaganda.”).
23. See, e.g., MARLIN, supra note 11, at 4 (“Lenin and Goebbels did not mind
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Further, previous definitions offered by scholars do not
contend sufficiently with the legal uses of the term, which
provide genuine (if hidden) insights into how we ought to
understand the concept. Collecting both legal and scholarly
uses will thus permit us to distill the essence of propaganda
and build up an informed and functional account that
renders it useful for application to contemporary
communications, including political gaslighting. The
following sampling of different uses and definitions of the
term will thus equip us to isolate a particular form of
problematic communication that can be defined objectively,
without losing the term’s negative connotation.
A. Legal Uses of the Term
The objective of this Section is not to catalog every single
use of the term “propaganda” in the law, a lengthy exercise
that promises diminishing returns for analytical purposes.
Rather, the objective is to gather a representative sample of
sources of law (carrying both linguistic and legal relevance
to the United States) with the aim of deriving meaningful
lessons about the concept of propaganda. Accordingly, this
Section will focus both on key international legal statements
(as rendered in English) that concern the United States, as
well as on uses of the term in domestic federal law.24
1. International law
In 1947—during the early days of the United Nations,
shortly after the conclusion of World War II—the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a resolution entitled,
“Measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters
of a new war.”25 Like much of the initial activity of the UN,
applying the term ‘propaganda’ to describe their attempts to mold opinion.”).
24. From the standpoint of offering exemplars of legal uses of the term,
including a thorough canvassing of American state law adds little; the types of
uses for the term in state law appear to overlap in significant respects with the
types of uses in federal law.
25. G.A. Res. 110 (II) A, Measures to be taken against propaganda and the
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the resolution responded directly to concerns about largescale international military conflict. The General Assembly
offered its resolution in light of the UN Charter’s joint
commitment “to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind” and to “promot[e] . . . universal
respect for, and observance of, fundamental freedoms, which
include freedom of expression . . . .”26 Without defining the
term, the resolution went on to “[c]ondemn[] all forms of
propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is
either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”27 Yet
the resolution also requested that each Member state “take
appropriate steps within constitutional limits . . . to promote,
by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them,
friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes
and Principles of the Charter . . . .”28
The resolution plainly uses the term “propaganda” to
refer to a mode of communication that must be defined
independently of the message conveyed. It also pegs the
General Assembly’s attitude toward propaganda completely
to the content of the message; the UN supports the
persuasive efforts of its member states to promote peaceful
international cooperation and opposes persuasive efforts to
promote international conflict. But it is entirely unclear from
the resolution what the voting states understood the term
“propaganda” to encompass, or how propagandistic
communications differ from non-propagandistic ones.
A similar understanding of propaganda appears in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which was drafted during roughly the same era and

inciters of a new war (Nov. 3, 1947).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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ultimately ratified by the United States in 1992.29 As one
component of the International Bill of Rights, the ICCPR
lays out fundamental civil and political rights that are
familiar to many Americans, including freedoms of thought
and expression.30 Article 20 of the ICCPR, however, bans
“propaganda for war,” as well as certain forms of advocacy of
“national, racial, or religious hatred.”31 Once again, the
instrument suggests that propaganda is a form of
communication rather than a label to be applied to a
particular message, and it expresses disapproval only of a
subset of propaganda—namely, that which promotes war.
And, once again, no definition of the term is otherwise
available.32
International humanitarian law (IHL), sometimes
known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict, also
bans some uses of propaganda. IHL by definition applies
largely in contexts that the UN propaganda bans discussed
above are meant to discourage from arising in the first place,
and its own ban on propaganda is quite limited. Specifically,
29. Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.
aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 30,
2020) (dating the Covenant to 1966 and documenting the United States’
ratification of the Covenant on June 8, 1992).
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18-19, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
31. Id.
32. See also MICHAEL G. KEARNEY, THE PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2007) (“Both the words propaganda and war suffer from

a distinct lack of definition for the purposes of international law . . . .”). Kearney’s
book offers a detailed examination of the prohibition of propaganda for war under
international law. Note that, as a party to the ICCPR, the United States would
have been obliged to enact legislation accordingly except that it “reserved” on
Article 20. Specifically, the U.S. conditioned its acceptance of the terms of the
ICCPR on, inter alia, the proposition that “Article 20 does not authorize or
require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the
right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” 138 CONG. REC. 8068, 8070 (1992); see also Kristina Ash, U.S.
Reservations to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights:
Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
[i], [viii]–[ix] (2005) (describing the U.S. reservation).
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Article 51 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (also known as
the Fourth Geneva Convention) states: “The Occupying
Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its
armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which
aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.”33 This
restriction dates to 1949,34 the same general period as the
General Assembly resolution on propaganda and the
drafting of the ICCPR. Once more, the treaty does not define
“propaganda,” though by implication we may understand it
to mean some sort of persuasive or even manipulative
communication, in this case one designed to get persons
protected by the convention to join the military services.35
By contrast with the international legal restrictions
arising in the wake of World War II, some of the more recent
action on the freedom of expression appears to accept the
negative connotation of the word “propaganda.” For example,
in 2017, expert representatives from the UN, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) issued a Joint Declaration on Freedom of
Expression and “Fake News,” Disinformation and
Propaganda.36 The declaration addresses the tension
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 973 U.N.T.S. 287, 320.
34. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (dating
and providing background to the Fourth Geneva Convention).
35. Before it was adopted, the restriction on propaganda in Article 51 was the
subject of some controversy. It constituted an expansion on the restrictions that
had previously been accepted on compelled military service, as expressed in the
Hague Conventions. See id. Some of the negotiating delegations proposed
deleting the second sentence of Article 51 altogether, bringing the text more into
alignment with the restrictions that had been previously recognized, but,
“[r]emembering the painful impression left by certain propaganda during the last
two world wars, the Conference decided to keep the prohibition as it was.” Id.
36. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the U.N. Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 12.
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between preserving freedom of expression and banning
certain modes of communication, and it gestures at a general
definition of the term “propaganda.”37 The declaration
specifically discourages state actors from “mak[ing],
“sponsor[ing], encourag[ing] or further disseminat[ing]
statements which they know or reasonably should know to
be false (disinformation) or which demonstrate a reckless
disregard for verifiable information (propaganda).”38
One important feature of these provisions is that they
target states or government actors rather than private
actors. That may seem to be of limited relevance because it
is well known that, under international law, the primary
bearers of duties are states (International humanitarian law
imposes duties on individuals as well although, in practice, a
substantial majority of the individuals who feel those
constraints fight on behalf of a state). But as the following
subsection demonstrates, domestic U.S. law also frequently
associates the concept of propaganda with governmental
communications.
2. Domestic law
a. Regulating foreign propaganda
For nearly half a century, U.S. federal law offered a
detailed definition of “political propaganda” in the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA). The FARA
originated “out of the investigations of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, formed in 1934 to
investigate Nazi propaganda activities in the United States
and the dissemination of subversive propaganda controlled
by foreign countries attacking the American form of
government.”39 It remains in effect but no longer utilizes all
of the same language. The act regulates certain activities
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 486 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in
part).
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undertaken by individuals on U.S. soil on behalf of “foreign
principal[s]”—that is, foreign governments, people or
entities—including political activities and lobbying, public
relations, solicitation and disbursement of money, or
representation of a foreign principals’ interest “before any
agency or official” of the U.S. federal government.40
Qualifying individuals must file registration statements
with the Attorney General, essentially identifying
themselves as foreign agents.41 Notably, in addition to being
“comprehensive,” the registration requirement applies
“equally to agents of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly
governments.”42 Moreover, individuals subject to the
registration requirement who disseminate “informational
materials for or in the interests of . . . foreign principals”
must label such materials appropriately and file copies with
the federal government.43 Although the statute now refers to
these as “informational materials,” it formerly referred to
such media as “political propaganda”44—and the relevant
section heading still does so.45 In essence, the FARA
requires, inter alia, that foreign agents identify certain of
their communications and media as propaganda.
Indeed, the FARA makes plain its purpose to moderate
the spread of propaganda, and more specifically:
[T]o protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign
relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by
persons engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for
or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and
other foreign principals so that the Government and the people of
the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons

40. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)–(c) (repealed 1995); § 612 (2012).
41. § 612.
42. Meese, 481 U.S. at 469–70.
43. See 22 U.S.C. § 614 (laying out some of the specific requirements).
44. See infra note 47.
45. See 22 U.S.C. § 614 (entitled “Filing and labeling of propaganda”).
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and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their
associations and activities.46

The term “propaganda” remains in certain headings in
the statute as well. The relevant chapter of the U.S. Code
that contains the FARA—Chapter 11 of Title 22—is entitled
“Foreign Agents and Propaganda,” and the relevant
subchapter
is
entitled
“Registration
of
Foreign
Propagandists.”
Until Congress removed many FARA references to
“political propaganda” via the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995, the statute defined the term “political propaganda” as
follows:
The term ‘political propaganda’ includes any oral, visual, graphic,
written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any
person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person
disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail
upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a
recipient or any section of the public within the United States with
reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of
a government or a foreign country or a foreign political party or with
reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in
the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which
advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social,
political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving
the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the
overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other
American republic by any means involving the use of force or
violence.47

This is a broad definition primarily encompassing
different forms of media that advance the interests of foreign
entities or harm specific U.S. interests. The definition

46. Meese, 481 U.S. at 469 (quoting 56 Stat. 248–249); see also id. at 486–87
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“The Act mandated disclosure, not direct
censorship, but the underlying goal was to control the spread of propaganda by
foreign agents. This goal was stated unambiguously by the House Committee on
the Judiciary: ‘We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a
deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 751381, at 2 (1937))).
47. Id. at 471–72 (majority opinion) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1994) (repealed
1995)).
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focuses on the content of the messaging (or the anticipated,
substantive effect of media as a result of its content) rather
than any particularly troubling mode of communication,
such as media that mislead in any particular way.
Before Congress removed this definition, the Supreme
Court entertained a lawsuit concerning the constitutionality
of labeling material “political propaganda” under the FARA.
The plaintiff—who had won an injunction below on a First
Amendment argument—sought to screen a trio of Canadian
movies that had been labeled “political propaganda” under
the FARA because “they contain[ed] political material
intended to influence the foreign policies of the United
States, or may reasonably [have been] adapted to be so
used.”48 The plaintiff did not want “the Department of
Justice and the public to regard him as the disseminator of
foreign political propaganda.”49
The nature of the plaintiff’s objection compelled the
Court to confront the divergent meanings of the word
“propaganda” discussed above.50 The Court observed that,
“[i]n popular parlance many people assume that propaganda
is a form of slanted, misleading speech that does not merit
serious attention and that proceeds from a concern for
advancing the narrow interests of the speaker rather than
from a devotion to the truth.”51 According to the Court, the
version of FARA in dispute captured “propaganda” both in
this negative sense, and in its broader, more neutral sense
as “advocacy materials that are completely accurate and
merit the closest attention and the highest respect.”52
The plaintiff ultimately lost his challenge, but
undisputed affidavits in the record and dissenting justices

48. Id. at 470.
49. Id. at 467.
50. See supra Part I.
51. Meese, 481 U.S. at 477.
52. Id.
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accepted the stigmatizing and therefore dissuasive force of
labeling media “propaganda.”53 More importantly, even with
the relatively recent edits, the FARA reflects a concern about
subversion of Americans’ opinions that may result from the
surreptitious circulation of media and messaging for the
benefit of foreign entities.54 Additional, sporadic references
in Executive Orders, Congressional statements, or the U.S.
Code—generally in sections related to international
relations—also describe the communications strategies of
foreign states and some non-state entities as “propaganda,”
typically without defining that term.55
53. See id. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (referring to the affidavits
and noting that they were uncontested).
54. See id. at 488 (“[I]t is fair to say that the original act reflected a perceived
close connection between political propaganda and subversion.”).
55. See, e.g., Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub. L. No.
114-328, § 1287, 130 Stat. 2000, 2546 (2016), as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1284, 132 Stat. 2076 (“The purpose of the [Department of
State Global Engagement] Center shall be to direct, lead, synchronize, integrate,
and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand,
expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and
disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security,
or stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.”);
Act of Apr. 3, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-96, § 1, 128 Stat. 1098, 1098 (“Congress finds
and declares . . . Russian forces have seized more than five television stations in
Crimea
and
taken
over
transmissions,
switching
to
a
24/7
Russian propaganda format; this increase in programming augments the already
robust pro-Russian programming to Ukraine [and] United States international
programming has the potential to combat this anti-democratic propaganda.”);
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §
1032 125 Stat. 1298, 1571 (2011) (“For each specified geographic area, a
description, analysis, and discussion of the core problems and contributing issues
that allow or could allow al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates to use the
area as a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks, engage in
propaganda, or raise funds and other support, including any ongoing or potential
radicalization of the population, or to use the area as a key transit route for
personnel, weapons, funding, or other support.”); Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 F.R.
46843 (Sept. 14, 2018) (“I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States
of America, find that the ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial
part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in
United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election
and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and
disinformation, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States.”).
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b. Regulating American propaganda
In addition to regulating foreign propaganda, the federal
government trafficked in its own propaganda, eventually
creating a legal framework to control the domestic
dissemination of its own messaging materials.56 In 1917,
President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public
Education (CPI), which worked to drum up domestic and
foreign support for U.S. involvement in World War I.57
George Creel, the chair of the CPI, described the committee’s
function as disseminating “[n]ot propaganda as the Germans
defined it, but propaganda in the true sense of the word,
meaning the ‘propagation of faith.’”58 According to
communications scholars, however, the CPI may not have
lived up to that description; it “has been widely criticized for
its use of intellectuals and journalists ‘to sell an unpopular
war to a dubious American public,’” including by “promoting
hatred toward Germans as enemies and monitoring of
suspicious neighbors.”59 A similar effort unfolded during
World War II, although this time operated by the Office of
War Information.60
After World War II, however, Congress formally took
organized steps to promote the international dissemination
of messaging by the federal government, as well as certain
measures to limit dissemination of such messaging
domestically. In 1948, Congress passed the United States
56. This Section does not provide a comprehensive survey of propaganda
efforts by the U.S. government. As a starting point for locating further
information on other such efforts, see Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The
Smith-Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War
Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2006).
57. Id. at 5.
58. William M. O’Barr, Public Service Advertising and Propaganda,
ADVERT. & SOC’Y REV. (2012), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/484935 (at start of
Section 2; pagination unknown). This quote refers to the origins of the term
“propaganda” in the evangelizing efforts of the Catholic Church. See MARLIN,
supra note 11, 17 and accompanying text.
59. Palmer & Carter, supra note 56, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 5–6.
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Information and Education Act—also known as the SmithMundt Act—which “authorized our government for the first
time in its history to conduct international information and
educational exchange activities on a permanent basis.”61
Notably, the statute does not use the word “propaganda”; its
stated purpose is “[t]o promote the better understanding of
the United States among the peoples of the world and to
strengthen cooperative international relations.”62 But the
genesis for the law lay partly in the perceived necessity to
counteract propaganda emanating from the Soviet Union,63
and members of Congress have described the efforts licensed
by the Smith-Mundt Act as constituting “U.S. Government
propaganda.”64
The law provided for the exchange of information,
educators and students between the United States and other
countries, and it authorized the State Department to

61. Burton Paulu, The Smith-Mundt
30 JOURNALISM Q. 300, 300 (1953).

Act:

A

Legislative

History,

62. United States Informational and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub.
L. No. 80-402, 62 Stat. 6, 6.
63. See Paulu, supra note 61, at 310 (“The case for the [bill that became the
Smith-Mundt Act] was fundamentally that which Secretaries Byrnes and
Marshall, and Assistant Secretary Benton, had presented earlier in connection
with [an earlier bill that did not become law]. It was said again that wide
dissemination of information about ourselves, our true ambitions, our strength,
and our policies would contribute to world understanding and peace, although
much more emphasis than before was placed on the need for an international
information program to reply to Russian propaganda attacks.”); see also Palmer
& Carter, supra note 56, at 8 (quoting legislative history of the Smith-Mundt Act
to acknowledge that “[t]he present hostile propaganda campaigns directed
against democracy, human welfare, freedom, truth, and the United States,
spearheaded by the Government of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties
throughout the world, call for urgent, forthright, and dynamic measures to
disseminate truth. The truth can constitute a satisfactory counter-defense
against actions which can only be described as psychological warfare against us
as well as the purposes of the United Nations.”).
64. See Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1989)
(quoting Senator Edward Zorinsky as justifying an amendment to the SmithMundt Act because “[t]he American taxpayer certainly does not need or want his
tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda directed at him or
her.”).
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disseminate “information about the United States, its people,
and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion
pictures, and other information media, and through
information centers and instructors abroad.”65 Initially, the
State Department did the latter through the distribution of
films, news bulletins, and Voice of America programming.66
Control over international broadcasting and exchange
services shifted in 1953, when President Dwight Eisenhower
established the United States Information Agency (USIA) to
manage these functions instead.67
Although the original version of the law did not explicitly
prohibit the State Department from disseminating its
programming domestically, some believed that such a ban
was intended.68 Eventually, in 1972, Congress eliminated
any doubt and amended the statute to state that media
produced pursuant to it by the U.S. government “[s]hall not
be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or
possessions.”69 Later edits would reinforce that ban in part

65. Palmer & Carter, supra note 56, at 7 (2006) (quoting United States
Informational and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-402, § 501,
62 Stat. 6, 9–10).
66. Weston R. Sager, Apple Pie Propaganda? The Smith-Mundt Act Before
and After the Repeal of the Domestic Dissemination Ban, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 511,
518 (2015).
67. Id. at 518–29. The USAI shut down in 1998, after its responsibilities
shifted to the Broadcasting Board of Governors. See id. at 524–25 (describing the
transition in greater detail).
68. See Palmer & Carter, supra note 56, at 9–10 (describing one instance of
such a dispute).
69. Id. at 10 (quoting Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-352, § 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2018))). Such
media would remain available under certain limitations to “representatives of
United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and
stations, and by research students and scholars, and, on request . . . to Members
of Congress.” Id. (quoting Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-352, § 204, 86 Stat. 489, 494 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2018))).
Congress arguably clarified its intent even earlier; in 1965, it passed a resolution
authorizing the domestic distribution of a single USIA film, the very need for
which suggests a ban was already in effect. See Sager, supra note 66, at 520–21
(describing the incident).
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because Congress did not want domestic audiences targeted
by their own government’s propaganda.70
The ban ultimately lifted when Congress passed the
Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 (as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013).71
Congress’s about-face on the domestic dissemination ban
reflected at least two concerns. First, the ban was
undesirable in the context of the War on Terror because
Congress perceived the need to push back against the
radicalization of domestic audiences; and, in any event,
technological advancements (and greater fluidity of media
generally) had come to limit the power of the government to
restrict domestic dissemination of its materials.72 The U.S.
Code nevertheless continues to bar certain forms of domestic
propaganda efforts, such as any funded by the Department
of Defense.73
Less information is available about a structurally
similar effort to regulate American messaging that began in
1999, when President Clinton secretly issued Presidential
Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68) to create an International
Public Information Core Group “to counteract propaganda by

70. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1167 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (“The statute’s plain language is reinforced by the Congress’s repeated
amendment of the Act to clarify and strengthen the ban on domestic distribution
of USIA materials.”); Palmer & Carter, supra note 56, at 10–11 (noting that
“Congress has tinkered with the language of the domestic dissemination ban
several times” and offering some details); see also Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency,
726 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (quoting Senator Edward Zorinsky as
justifying an amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act because “[t]he American
taxpayer certainly does not need or want his tax dollars used to support U.S.
Government propaganda directed at him or her.”).
71. See John Hudson, U.S. Repeals Propaganda Ban, Spreads GovernmentMade News to Americans, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 14, 2013, 7:06 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/14/u-s-repeals-propaganda-ban-spreadsgovernment-made-news-to-americans/ (describing the legislative change).
72. See Sager, supra note 66, at 526–27.
73. See 10 U.S.C. § 2241a (2018) (“Funds available to the Department of
Defense may not be obligated or expended for publicity or propaganda purposes
within the United States not otherwise specifically authorized by law.”).
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enemies of the United States.”74 Although the purpose of the
Group was to “influence the emotions, motives, objective
reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups and individuals,” the
information it was to disseminate purported to be “truthful,”
and it does not appear that PDD 68 characterized the
Group’s activities as propagandistic.75 Much like the later
revisions to the Smith-Mundt Act, PDD 68 noted that IPI
Core Group activities should be “overt and address foreign
audiences only.”76 It is possible that the Group never got off
the ground,77 but its similarities to the Smith-Mundt Act are
instructive.
c. Other miscellaneous references to “propaganda” in
federal law
Both statutes and courts have occasionally used the term
“propaganda” in a variety of other contexts. The term
sometimes describes communications that advocate for a
particular type of ideology, such as religious,78 racist,79 or
political views.80 These scattered uses are individually too
74. See International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision Directive
PDD 68 30 April 1999, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd68.htm (last visited June 15, 2020). The full text of the directive does not appear
to be publicly available.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See William P. Kiehl, Seduced and Abandoned: Strategic Information and
the National Security Council Process, in AFFAIRS OF THE STATE 356-57 (Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008) (suggesting the group only met once during the Clinton
administration).
78. See United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 845 (2019) (upholding a terrorism conviction of an individual
who, inter alia, posted “ISIS propaganda” on Facebook); Busey v. District of
Columbia, 138 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (considering the constitutionality of
enforcing certain fees against “street sellers of religious propaganda”).
79. See Hernandez v. Superintendent, Fredericksburg-Rappahannock Joint
Sec. Ctr., 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (E.D. Va. 1992) (entertaining a challenge to
the arrest of a member of the Ku Klux Klan effected while he was “distributing
Klan propaganda”).
80. See Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405, 406 (N.D. Cal. 1964), aff’d sub
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infrequent to provide much guidance for an investigation
into the nature of propaganda, although collectively they
show that advocacy of a particular viewpoint—especially an
unpopular or disfavored viewpoint—is at times described as
“propaganda.”81 Indeed, courts have upheld prosecutions for
treason undertaken against individuals who participated in
German propaganda efforts during World War II.82
Sometimes the use of the term specifically captures the
dissemination of false information.83 But that is not always
so. One of the few contexts in which the term consistently
appears relates to information circulated in connection with
union elections in matters handled by the National Labor
Relations Board.84 Here the label attaches to persuasive
nom. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a
statute that prohibited the mailing of “communist political propaganda”).
81. In the context of taxation, it is less clear that a negative connotation
attaches to the term “propaganda.” For example, the tax code limits tax
exemptions for certain types of organizations if a “substantial part of [their]
activities [involve] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); see also Food, Agriculture, Conservation,
and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359, Sec. 1264(j), as
amended Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-237, 105 Stat. 1905 (adopting a similar usage of the term by
stipulating that the “[Tree Planting] Foundation shall not engage in lobbying
or propaganda for the purpose of influencing legislation and shall not participate
or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.”).
82. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (upholding
a treason conviction based in part on allegations that the defendant participated
in “the psychological warfare of the German Government against the United
States” by assisting with “radio broadcasts and the making of phonographic
recordings with the intent that they would be used in broadcasts to the United
States and to American Expeditionary Forces in French North Africa, Italy,
France and England,” and describing such efforts as spreading “German
propaganda”).
83. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320 (D.
Mass. 2013) (noting, in connection with allegations that the defendant aided and
abetted crimes against humanity, that he had “generated and distributed
propaganda that falsely vilified the [LGBTI] community to inflame public hatred
against it”).
84. See, e.g., NLRB v. Big Three Indus. Gas & Equip. Co., 441 F.2d 774, 775
(5th Cir. 1971) (referring, in a neutral way, to “campaign propaganda”
disseminated by a union shortly after it filed an election petition); NLRB v. TRW-
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information, often but not necessarily false or dubious,
associated with a specific side in a formal campaign. We will
revisit these various legal uses of the term below.
B. Scholarly Uses of the Term
As part of a book-length treatment of the subject,
philosopher Randal Marlin collects and analyzes a number
of definitions of “propaganda.” He sorts the definitions into
different categories: descriptive, stipulative, hegemonic,
persuasive, negative, neutral, and favorable.85 A number of
these categories manifest in the legal uses canvassed in the
preceding Section. The neutral definitions gathered by
Marlin are especially helpful because they provide an
objective baseline against which we might find a negative
definition to differ. Neutral definitions include: “the
spreading of information whether it be true or false, good or
bad—literally ‘spreading the faith’”;86 “the attempt to
influence the public opinions of an audience through the
transmission of ideas and values”;87 and “dissemination of
ideas, information or rumor for the purpose of helping or
injuring an institution, a cause or a person.”88 Note that
these definitions apply the label “propaganda” to particular
modes of communication.

Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1967) (considering a petition to
enforce a decision of the National Labor Relations Board against an employer
that disseminated “anti-union propaganda . . . in an attempt to persuade its
employees to vote against a union in a representation election being held by the
Board”).
85. See MARLIN, supra note 11, at 5–10. The “favorable definitions” offered by
Marlin are not in fact actual definitions; they are more statements of support for
undefined communication methods that the speakers regard as propaganda. See
id. at 10–11 (quoting Brendan Bracken and John Grierson as adopting the label
“propaganda” for communications methods they each endorse).
86. Id. at 10 (quoting Vernon McKenzie).
87. Id. (quoting Richard Taylor).
88. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL NEW DICTIONARY (1966)).
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Given the turn toward viewing propaganda negatively, it
is unsurprising that Marlin’s largest sample of definitions
qualify as negative.89 Consider a subset of these:
•“Propaganda is concerned with the management of opinions and
attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather
than by altering other conditions in the environment of the
organism.”90
•Propaganda is “a means of gaining power by the psychological
manipulation of groups or masses, or of using this power with the
support of the masses.”91
•“Propaganda is the more or less systematic effort to manipulate
other people’s beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols
(words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia,
hairstyles, designs on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). A
relatively heavy emphasis on deliberateness and manipulativeness
distinguishes propaganda from casual conversation or the free and
easy exchange of ideas.”92
•“Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve
a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”93
•“Propaganda can be called the attempt to affect the personalities
and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered
unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a given time.”94

These are objective, negative definitions of the sort we
seek. After sorting through the variety of definitions he has
culled, Marlin concludes that the term should be defined
negatively as well. He offers the following definition: “[t]he
organized attempt through communication to affect belief or
action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that
circumvent or support an individual’s adequately informed,

89. See id. at 8–9 (offering nine negative definitions).
90. Id. at 8 (quoting Harold Lasswell).
91. Id. (quoting and translating Jacques Ellul).
92. Id. at 9 (quoting Bruce L. Smith).
93. Id. (quoting Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell).
94. Id. at 8 (quoting Leonard Doob).
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rational, reflective judgment.”95 Marlin’s definition
incorporates the notion of manipulation by implication,
though, unlike many of the definitions he collects, he omits
that word itself due to concerns about how to define it.96
Marlin also adds two notable features that seem especially
relevant for analyzing something like political gaslighting:
organization and the targeting of large audiences. I will
argue below that these conditions are erroneous if
understood as essential elements of propaganda; on my
favored interpretation of the concept, however, there is good
reason that these conditions correlate frequently with
propaganda.
Philosopher Jason Stanley has also contributed
significantly to making sense of the concept of propaganda.
Stanley’s primary treatment of the subject, How Propaganda
Works, focuses on a particular type of propaganda—namely
“masking propaganda,” or “the kind that characteristically
masks the gap between the given ideal and reality by the
propagandistic use of that very ideal.”97 Stanley pursues this
form of propaganda because he is especially interested in
how propaganda operates in democratic societies, where
norms of free speech lay the groundwork for the spread of
propaganda, which in turn constitutes “a serious threat to
democracy.”98 Stanley also identifies a “classical sense” of the
term, which is broader than the form of propaganda he

95. See id. at 12 (“The word ‘manipulation’ would be convenient for [a key]
idea [in Marlin’s definition of “propaganda”], but there are definitional problems
arising in connection with that term itself.”). Specifically, Marlin believes it “is
crucial . . . that the propagandist sets the stage to provide some false or
unexamined premise in the picture of reality affecting a propagandee’s action.”
Id.
96. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining Marlin’s concern in
greater detail).
97. See STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 51. Stanley is interested in
certain implications of “masking” propaganda of this sort—for example, because
“[f]ailures of democracy could be hidden by the propagandistic use of the very
vocabulary of liberalism.” Id.
98. Id. at 34.
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devotes his book to elucidating.99 Although he declines to
explore the connections between masking propaganda and
the classical sense of propaganda,100 he defines the latter to
mean “the manipulation of the rational will to close off
debate.”101 He also attributes a more nuanced version of this
classic sense of propaganda to Noam Chomsky, a view that
defines propaganda as a form of “biased speech,” or “speech
that irrationally closes off certain options that should be
considered.”102
C. Refining the Definition of “Propaganda” to Derive a
Comprehensive Model
The legal uses of “propaganda,” although often
undefined, impliedly reflect quite varied and divergent uses
of the concept, whereas the inconsistencies among scholarly
views—especially those focused on an objective, negative
definition—are somewhat narrower. To the extent scholars
have disagreed about the term, that is expected and perhaps
ideal; it reflects robust engagement, from a variety of
perspectives, with a complex phenomenon of substantial
public concern. It is interesting and meaningful that,
notwithstanding the diverse and numerous viewpoints
reflected above, it is clearly possible to identify some
consistent features among the various definitions available.
The inconsistent use of the term in the law is a different
matter. Law is designed in large part to guide human
behavior, and its undefined use of complex terms leaves open
the possibility of misunderstanding or good-faith
disagreement about what it stipulates. Moreover, the law
99. See id. at 48 (defining “the classical sense of propaganda”).
100. See id. at 49 (describing this choice).
101. See id. at 48. In an interview with Vox, Stanley provided a similar
definition: “Propaganda is the use of images or language to manipulate people.”
Sean Illing, How Propaganda Works in the Digital Age, VOX (Oct. 20, 2019, 8:47
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/10/18/20898584/fox-newstrump-propaganda-jason-stanley.
102. STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 49.
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does not label all regulated communications as propaganda,
even when they are best understood as such.103 However, the
law’s uneven handling of propaganda contains key insights
that can be integrated into an objective and negative
definition of “propaganda”—even in instances where the law’s
use of the term implies acceptance of a definition that is not
negative, or not objective, or neither. Incorporating those
insights into a preferred definition of “propaganda” will
make that definition more palatable because it will reflect
the concerns that have led to regulation of speech in the law
across a broad range of contexts.
1. Manipulation
Let us begin with one point of near-consensus at the
scholarly level: propaganda, in its negative sense, involves
the manipulation of an audience (or something like it). That
is the most salient theme both in the definitions Marlin
marshals and in Stanley’s treatment of the classical sense of
propaganda. This is a valuable starting point because
manipulation is a mode of communication and not per se
about the content of communications; there may be a
correlation between a communication’s manipulative
propensity and certain types of content, but in theory one can
manipulate another with respect to just about any factual
proposition.104 Adopting manipulation as a cornerstone of the
103. For example, the federal government regulates certain types of claims
that it regards to be dubious or false, threatening legal action against certain
speakers who make them, even without labeling those claims propagandistic.
See, e.g., Neena Satija & Lena H. Sun, A Major Funder of the Anti-Vaccine
Movement has Made Millions Selling Natural Health Products, WASH. POST (Dec.
20, 2019, 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2019/
10/15/fdc01078-c29c-11e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html#click=https://t.co/
mX9SmEatQ3 (describing warnings issued by the Food and Drug Administration
to an osteopathic physician who has marketed a number of his own products on
the basis of questionable or false claims about their health effects).
104. Note that “communication” is itself a broad term. It covers not just speech,
written language, images, videos, and so forth, but other more nuanced means of
disseminating a particular message. See, e.g., Daniel Bessner (@dbessner),
TWITTER (June 9, 2020, 5:36 PM), https://twitter.com/dbessner/status/
1270469851916546048?s=20

2020] LIES, GASLIGHTING AND PROPAGANDA

1067

definition of propaganda conduces to an objective and
negative understanding of the term, as discussed above.
Manipulation is an elusive concept, which is why Marlin
ultimately shies away from it. The scholarly definitions
above suggest agreement that propaganda is persuasive in
some illicit sense, and more specifically that it manipulates
by distorting the rational will of an agent— interfering with
her ability to take warranted logical steps in processing
information. For example, it “irrationally closes off certain
options that should be considered,”105 or operates by “social
suggestion.”106 There is disagreement about whether
manipulation requires deception, although a particularly
focused attempt to understand the concept of manipulation
by Joel Rudinow argues that deception is not essential.107 It
is this account that gives Marlin pause.108
Even Rudinow concedes that manipulation typically
involves deception, however, and his argument for the need
to account for other types of cases is curious.109 Further, if

(offering a photograph of a board game entitled “Clintonopoly! The Great
American Sell-Off Game,” which features caricatures of Bill and Hillary Clinton
on the cover and clearly conveys a political message).
105. STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 49 (citing HERMAN & CHOMSKY,
supra note 11).
106. MARLIN, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting Harold Lasswell).
107. See generally Joel Rudinow, Manipulation, 88 ETHICS 338 (1978) (arguing
that it is possible to manipulate a person without deceiving him).
108. See MARLIN, supra note 11, at 12 (citing Rudinow to support the conclusion
that “there are definitional problems arising with” the word “manipulation”).
109. Rudinow ultimately settles on a rather complicated definition of
“manipulation.” He claims that a person attempts to manipulate another if and
only if he “attempts the complex motivation of [another’s] behavior by means of
deception or by playing on a supposed weakness of [that person].” Rudinow, supra
note 107, at 346. Complex motivation involves “attempt[ing] to motivate
someone’s behavior in a way which one presumes will alter (usually by
complicating) the person’s project (complex of goals).” Id. at 345. Complex
motivation contrasts with “simple motivation,” the latter of which occurs when
one attempts “to motivate someone’s behavior in a way which one presumes to be
consonant with the person’s antecedently adopted or already operative goals.” Id.
Rudinow elaborates on the distinction as follows:
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previous scholarly work on the concept tells us anything,
propaganda concerns itself with a particular type of
manipulation: the type that irrationally shapes the beliefs of
generally rational agents. As a result, I contend that
deception is an essential element of the manipulation that
lies at the heart of propaganda: a communication cannot
function as propaganda unless at least one thing about it—
its source, its phrasing, its imagery, its delivery—deceives an
agent into make incorrect judgments when processing it. In
other words, the communication hijacks or corrupts the
rational processes of the audience to lead the audience to
Thus, for instance, if I respond to your request for directions by deceiving
you about them, I am probably attempting to motivate your behavior,
but in a way which I presume to be consonant with your present project.
But if I falsely indicate an interest in joining you in some activity which
I secretly hope thereby to get you to stop, I am attempting to motivate
your behavior, but not in a way which I presume to be consonant with
your present project. Your project now becomes more complicated
because you now have the goal, which presumably was not operative in
your undertaking and pursuing the activity, of frustrating my attempt
at cooperation with you.
Id. The complications Rudinow incorporates into his definition appear to me
unnecessary. The reason Rudinow distinguishes between simple and complex
motivation is essentially that he does not intuitively regard unsophisticated
misdirection—such as deliberately giving someone bad directions—as skillful
enough to amount to manipulation. See id. at 343–44 (explaining this view). This
strikes me as a classic (albeit unsophisticated) example of manipulation,
although note that the sophistication of a communication’s manipulative power
remains relevant to our assessment of it as propaganda. See infra Section I.C.2.
(explaining the significance of persuasive power to an assessment of propaganda).
Moreover, the case Rudinow offers to show that deception is not essential to
manipulation is questionable. Rudinow envisions Smith presenting himself to an
admitting officer at a psychiatric clinic, seeking admission for reasons of
convenience. After being denied admission, Smith tells the admitting officer that
he will simply climb to a building rooftop and claim to be suicidal, forcing the
police to bring him in and have him admitted. Smith then executes his plan, as a
result of which he reappears before the admitting officer later, now escorted by
police. The circumstances compel the admitting officer to admit Smith on pain of
being accused of professional irresponsibility. See Rudinow, supra note 107, at
340 (presenting the case). Although it is arguable that Smith manipulated the
police officers into bringing him to the psychiatric clinic, the nature of the
pressure on the admitting officer is categorically different—it is more like a form
of coercion—and I see no reason to gloss over that distinction by adopting the
same label for both.
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incorrect conclusions.110 Frequently, this will arise because
the communication contains false information (offered as
true) or omits germane, true information (without noting its
absence),111 but more subtle variations include misleading
implications carried by a communication in virtue of its
source or its form.
We may distinguish two primary forms of manipulation
on this model: manipulation as to content, and manipulation
as to confidence. Manipulation as to content generally occurs
when a communication inserts false premises into an agent’s
deliberative process (while suggesting those premises are
true), or primes the agent to draw improper inferences or
deductions from a true premise. It leads to false beliefs, or to
conclusions that do not follow. Manipulation as to confidence
induces the agent to give improper weight to the
communication, even if that communication does not mislead
the audience as to content. Often manipulation as to
confidence arises when the communication purports to be, or
is misunderstood to be, something it is not (such as when
someone interprets fiction to be nonfiction, or reads advocacy
materials originating from one source while believing them
to be from another).

110. I use the term “incorrect” rather than “irrational” to account for the fact
that one can manipulate others without corrupting the rationality of their
thinking in the strongest sense. For example, if a communication manipulatively
asserts a false proposition, the audience might take that proposition to be true
and therefore draw whatever conclusions logically follow. Strictly speaking, those
conclusions could be rational—the proper conclusions to draw from the premises
in hand—even though they may be mistaken because a fundamental premise
behind them is false. At a higher level, however, a communication that operates
in this way still interferes with the rational processes of the audience because it
deceptively uses those processes to lead the audience to a conclusion that is (ex
hypothesi) false. That approach should be sufficient for my account to capture the
typical concerns about the effects of propaganda, which are often described in
terms of its effects on rationality.
111. In any given dispute about whether a particular communication is
manipulative in this sense, among the most difficult matters to resolve might be
whether it omits germane information.
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Although these two categories are distinct in theory, they
will often overlap in practice. Both forms of manipulation
may result from the affirmative provision of false
information or the withholding of true information, and often
manipulation as to content on one matter will set the stage
for manipulation as to confidence on another. If I falsely
present myself as a trained medical professional before
asserting a series of true propositions about the merits of a
particular medical intervention, I will manipulate my
audience both as to the content of their beliefs about my
identity and as to their proper level of confidence in the
merits of the medical intervention. A notable implication of
this view is that a true communication may still manipulate.
Although that may be a controversial view, it is not novel.
For example, Jason Stanley convincingly rejects the idea
that, to operate as propaganda, a communication must be
false.112 He points out that true propositions can be (and
often are) deployed to imply false ones, such as by suggesting
threats. He gives the example of a politician claiming, “There
are Muslims among us,” which is plainly true in many
contexts but which may be uttered with the intent of
implying a hidden threat.113
Antidotes to these forms of manipulation include full
disclosure of relevant facts about the source, accurate
content, and sensitivity to the unwarranted implications of a
communication (which includes the provision of relevant
context and qualifications). These antidotes are in essence a
demand for additional information; media premised on
brevity—memes, tweets, headlines—carry particular
potential to manipulate because they possess no mechanism
for providing much of the additional information that staves
off erroneous processing by a rational audience.
112. See STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 42 (labeling the assumption
that propaganda must be false the “falsity thesis” and explaining that he will
reject it).
113. See id. at 42–43 (using this example to support his rejection of the falsity
thesis).

2020] LIES, GASLIGHTING AND PROPAGANDA

1071

Several clarifications are in order. First, creatures below
a certain level of rationality are not eligible to be
manipulated in this way. Many animals and especially young
children, for example, are incapable of processing language
or other information in a sufficiently rational manner to be
duped in a meaningful sense by manipulative
communications. Within audiences that cross the requisite
threshold for rationality, the propensity of a communication
to manipulate may still depend in significant part (among
other things) on the epistemic sophistication of the
audience.114 Even above the line of requisite rationality,
there is no reason to assume all members of an audience
share the same level of resistance to manipulation.
Second, this broad way of understanding manipulation
allows us to make incredibly important moral distinctions
between communications that are designed or used for
manipulation and those that simply happen to function in a
manipulative way for unintended reasons.115 This is a
desirable feature of the present account, for it is essential to
identify the distinctions we might otherwise miss: A
communication can be created as propaganda if its creator
intends it to manipulate an audience in this sort of way. It
can be disseminated as propaganda when it is circulated for
the purpose of manipulating an audience in this sort of way.
It can function as propaganda even if it is not inherently
manipulative, so long as the agent interpreting it is deceived
in some way by it or by its implications.116

114. But see WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 3–4 (1927) (expressing a
much less optimistic view of the capacities of adults to make sense of the world
around them—that is, to be rational in the sense in which I make use of that term
here).
115. Compare that to the narrow account of propaganda offered by Sheryl
Tuttle Ross. Sheryl Tuttle Ross, Understanding Propaganda: The Epistemic
Merit Model, 36 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 16–30 (2002) (requiring propaganda, even if
true, to be delivered with a specific purpose).
116. It is plausible that people generally operate under a defeasible duty not
to create or disseminate communications for propaganda purposes, and likewise
that they ought generally to avoid communicating in a manner that is likely to
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It is important to be able to talk about propaganda in
each of these senses. To do so requires a definition of
propaganda broad enough to account for the fact that these
categories can come apart. For example, let us stipulate that
much World War II-era Nazi propaganda was created to
manipulate audience attitudes toward certain minorities. It
was likely also disseminated (originally) with the purpose of
manipulating audiences, and it may well have succeeded in
convincing people to fear, hate, or mistrust the targeted
minorities. Such communications would therefore qualify as
propagandistic in all three senses identified above: based on
the purpose behind their creation, the purpose behind their
dissemination, and their ultimate effect. But one can take
the very same communications today and disseminate them
to a class as part of a study of propaganda—plainly not with
the purpose of manipulating one’s audience and, by placing
the materials in their historical context, not in fact doing so.
In such a situation, the materials at issue were still created
to function as propaganda, but they were not distributed as
propaganda and did not actually function as propaganda.
The categories can come apart in the other direction as
well. Material can be created as art or fiction, meant to evoke
emotional responses but not to manipulate audiences into
accepting unfounded factual propositions, and then be
coopted for propaganda purposes, or misunderstood to
propagandistic effect. Thus, certain material may function as
propaganda even if the creator or disseminator bears no
moral blame, or bears only a relatively small share of blame
for knowingly creating or circulating material that is likely
to be misunderstood (rather than the greater share of blame
one might bear for intending to manipulate people).
The fact that these categories are clearly severable is
only one reason for adopting a definition of propaganda that
admits of their separation. One of the features of legal
function as propaganda. Those serving in roles in which communications carry
special weight with an audience—political figures, journalists, teachers, parents,
and so forth—likely operate under a particularly stringent version of this duty.
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regulation of propaganda is a strong concern with the
function of certain communications. Recall the former FARA
definition of “political propaganda,” which:
includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other
communication or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably
adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes
will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert,
induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of
the public within the United States with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations of a government or a foreign
country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign
policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial,
religious, or social dissensions . . . .117

This language encompasses communications that serve
a particular persuasive purpose, as well as those that are
“reasonably adapted” to do so regardless of the intentions of
the person circulating them. Whether or not this is a good
definition, to the extent the law ever seeks to regulate
propaganda, it is plainly easier to target communications
with an arguable propensity to mislead than it is to require
that the distributor meets demonstrated state-of-mind
requirements.118
This leads to a further key point about why we should
carve out space for communications that function as
propaganda regardless of why they were created or shared.
In his book on propaganda, Stanley rejects not just the idea
that propaganda must be false, but also the idea that, to
constitute propaganda, a communication must be offered
insincerely.119 For him, the sincere delivery of propaganda is
117. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 471–72 (1987) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 611(j)
(repealed 1995)).
118. I take no general position here on the desirability of legal regulations of
propaganda because much of the wisdom and constitutionality of doing so
depends on particular circumstances, but it is plainly important to understand
what constitutes propaganda in any given context before one can propose
effectively to regulate it.
119. STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 41–42 (labeling these two
assumptions the “falsity thesis” and the “insincerity thesis,” respectively, and
explaining that he will reject both).
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possible because of the connection “between propaganda and
flawed ideological belief.”120 The account here creates
conceptual space for that result. Distinguishing between the
motives behind the creation or dissemination of a
communication on one hand and the communication’s
function on the other allows us, in turn, to distinguish those
who seek to manipulate their audiences from true believers
who manipulate their audiences incidentally.
A third clarification: like “propaganda,” the word
“manipulation” has multiple meanings, but it carries a
negative connotation in the sense explained in this Section.
To constitute the sort of manipulation essential to
propaganda, a communication must be created as,
disseminated as, or functioning as manipulative in a manner
that is illicit according to the operative norms set by the
context. For example, deceptive strategies that are permitted
by the rules of sports or games—such as trick plays or
fakes—are not manipulative in any illicit sense, and they
therefore would not amount to the sort of manipulation
essential to propaganda. That is not to say that trickery in
sports would otherwise amount to propaganda; as discussed
below, illicit manipulation of rational will is not a sufficient
condition for propaganda, and the other conditions all but
rule out the possibility of propaganda arising in the context
of sport or game. But it is an important qualifier to bear in
mind.
Rudinow puzzles over this fact. “Interestingly enough,”
he observes, “one almost never hears the word ‘manipulation’
used in describing the various stratagems, fakes, feints, and
finesses of competitive sports and games, though these often
exhibit nearly every feature of manipulation.”121 His
explanation is that “typically the competitor in such a contest
seeks not the complex but the simple motivation of his

120. Id. at 41.
121. Rudinow, supra note 107, at 346.
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opponent’s behavior.”122 The more direct and compelling
explanation is simply that misleading an opponent about
how one plans to move a ball down the field of play, for
example, or how one plans to trap the opponent’s king on a
chessboard, is part of the enterprise at issue; these are
contexts in which we allow for or even honor trickery.
The norms are similar in a relevant respect in litigation,
where it is understood that counsel for opposing sides
advance the interests of their respective clients—within
certain established parameters set by applicable court rules
and rules of professional conduct. Making one’s case
effectively involves minimizing certain facts and
emphasizing others, even if (or especially because) the effect
of doing so may be tendentious. Although deliberately
advancing falsehoods is not permissible, even the selective
presentation of facts to support a helpful narrative could
easily be manipulative in another setting. In litigation,
however, both sides should possess a roughly equal
opportunity to present competing narratives, and the
audience should understand the purpose of each side’s
presentation and the broader nature of the enterprise. Legal
advocacy in this form, when it conforms to governing norms,
is therefore not manipulative in the illicit sense defined here.
Consider one further example. Although the law of
armed conflict prohibits certain forms of perfidy,123 other
forms of misdirection targeting opposing forces—leaking
information to falsely suggest a strategic retreat, for
example—would not violate acceptable norms of the
enterprise at issue, and thus would not be eligible to be
considered propaganda, even if they met the further criteria
described below. The absence of relevant and clear-cut norms
distinguishes that situation from one where military forces

122. Id.
123. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 37,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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provide misleading communications to civilians on an
opposing side about their own government, as well as more
general situations involving the dissemination of
manipulative communications that bear on democratic
deliberation about matters of public concern.
Finally, note that on this understanding of
manipulation, like any other, there will be close cases. In
many instances, earnest and good faith disagreement may
arise about whether a communication is manipulative. That
is neither here nor there from an analytic standpoint—it is
certainly not a strike against the account—but it may be
helpful to clarify that fact from the outset.
2. Persuasive power and persuasive effect124
Suppose we adopt the definition of “manipulation”
discussed in the preceding subsection, and we conclude that
it is a necessary component of propaganda. It remains true
that interpersonal manipulation is relatively common, but it
does not seem to rise, intuitively, to the level of
propaganda—even in situations where it is morally
unacceptable. Partners, friends and acquaintances lie to
each other all the time, sometimes for (at least arguably)
acceptable reasons. The various legal restrictions surveyed
above reinforce such intuitions because they do not appear to
concern themselves with run-of-the-mill interpersonal
manipulation either. This subsection argues that routine
interpersonal manipulation falls short of propaganda
because it typically lacks both of the other key ingredients:
124. The following Section deploys a number of examples of campaigns that
could, on my account, amount to propaganda. Whether they ultimately amount
to propaganda will depend in the first instance on whether they manipulate
audiences in a relevant respect as described in the preceding subsection. Some of
these cases will amount to propaganda, if they do, because they advance false
propositions. Although many will agree that the selected examples involve the
advancement of false belief, others will not. I do not mean to suggest, in any
event, that it is improper to debate the truth of the propositions associated with
the campaigns identified below; instead, the lessons from this account are that
commentators must take particular care in debating propositions that run
against the grain of evidence.
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persuasive power and persuasive effect. Persuasive power
refers to the sophistication or resources behind the
manipulative message, such as whether it emanates from
authority or is amplified or corroborated by multiple
additional sources. Persuasive effect refers to the broader
social or political significance of the proposition(s) being
advanced.
Imagine a teen manipulating his father into accepting a
false proposition about why he missed his curfew the night
before. Absent special circumstances, I want to suggest that
his efforts fall short of traditional understandings of
propaganda both because of the trivial social or political
implications of the proposition he is advancing and because
of the relatively unsophisticated means at his disposal to
advance it. The teen’s whereabouts may be of massive
significance to his parents, but they do not generally have
wider consequences for the community at large, let alone his
country. And the sophistication of his efforts to prop up a lie
may vary by circumstance—perhaps he enlists the
assistance of a friend to provide a false alibi—but those
efforts do not rise to the same level as quintessential
propaganda campaigns, which involve the coordinated use of
multimedia broadcast by numerous sources.
I therefore propose that a comprehensive, objective, and
negative understanding of the term “propaganda”
encompasses any manipulative communication (as defined
above) backed by significant persuasive power and bearing
significant persuasive effect. As described above, whether it
is manipulative in the qualifying sense depends in part on
the context for its origination and use, and, in analyzing it as
propaganda, we must remain sensitive to the distinctions
between the intention behind its creation, the intention
behind its dissemination, and its ultimate effect. We can
identify the criteria for the comprehensive account of
propaganda in visual form, with a few examples plotted for
illustrative purposes:
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Propensity of Manipulative Communications
to Qualify as Propaganda

Persuasive Effect

Goebbels at a
dinner party

Anti-vax
campaign

Flat-Earth
campaign

President
Trump's typical
political
gaslighting
claims

Promotion of
Santa Claus
myth to
children

Routine
interpersonal
dishonesty

Persuasive Power

Government's
false claims of
proof of WMD
in Iraq
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Assume that this chart depicts the entire universe of
communications that are manipulative in the sense defined
in Section I.C.1. The arc in the bottom-left corner carves out
those communications that do not rise to the level of
propaganda because they are neither of sufficient social
importance nor sufficiently powerful or sophisticated. We
might quibble about the size of the arc, but the tricky
teenager’s case should fall within it regardless of the precise
placement of the boundary.125
By contrast, a sophisticated, government-orchestrated
campaign to generate support for an armed conflict—such as
a coordinated, multi-pronged effort to persuade the public
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction—would
score high on both axes and fall clearly outside of the arc.
Leaving aside the contested question of whether (and to what
extent) individual actors in the government at the time
genuinely believed this key proposition to be false, it is now
clear that Iraq did not have such weapons and thus that
those communications functioned to mislead the public into
accepting a proposition that was relevant to their support for
the war.126 In other words, those communications operated
as propaganda—and that would remain the case even if the
government’s push to persuade the public reflected nothing
but good faith.127 That is a function of both the persuasive
effect of the key proposition (the implications of its truth for
125. As with the size of the arc, we might also legitimately debate the precise
placement of any of the points on the graph—and indeed some of the dots will
naturally shift somewhat over time—though the broader analytic claims about
them should stand.
126. See Glenn Kessler, The Iraq War and WMDs: An Intelligence Failure or
White House Spin?, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligencefailure-or-white-house-spin/ (noting that Iraq did not ultimately possess weapons
of mass destruction and exploring the question of whether officials within the
Bush administration conveyed information to the contrary deliberately or
mistakenly).
127. See supra Section I.C.1. (distinguishing the creation or dissemination of
communications for the purpose of manipulation from the circulation of
communications that function to manipulate the audience).
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public support for large-scale, international armed conflict),
and the underlying persuasive power of relevant messaging
(the complex and sophisticated nature of the machine that
generated the messaging in support of it). Notably, it is
worth observing that the government consistently relied on
claims that it possessed unique information—intelligence
unavailable to the public—that served to heighten its
persuasive power.128
Other sorts of cases may divide intuitions, but they also
sharpen our views about where to draw the arc and help
define the scope of the account presented here. Consider the
case of propaganda with significant persuasive power but
limited persuasive effect. For example, let us assume that at
least some of the children targeted by parents and media
spreading the Santa Claus myth are rational enough to
qualify as targets of rational manipulation. The relatively
sophisticated and coordinated means of spreading that myth
give it substantial persuasive power: Santa shows up in
cartoons and commercials, on food packaging and in songs,
and even (purportedly in person) at local malls. Many
parents simultaneously instill the myth in their children as
if by silent or unstated agreement, as a result of which most
children see the myth reinforced by their peers. But the
public policy implications (persuasive effect) of the
proposition that Santa exists are relatively minor, albeit not
necessarily trivial. The proposition is also one that tends to
fade when confronted with the level of skepticism brought to
bear by older children, so its lasting effects are inherently
limited.
There are also examples of propaganda with less
persuasive power but greater persuasive effect, such as the
anti-vaccine (“anti-vax”) movement. The public health
128. The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence assembled an
entire report on the intelligence used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003. See
SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONGRESS, REP. ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMM.’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ (2004),
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf.
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consequences of the claims advanced by the anti-vax
movement are significant, and some of those consequences
have in fact materialized as a result of advocacy from
associated groups.129 The sophistication of the campaign is
significant but not overwhelming; the group has an Internet
presence and certain celebrity supporters,130 but it is not as
well funded or coordinated as certain government or
powerful corporate campaigns. Somewhat similarly, there is
a recognized community of people who believe the Earth is
flat. Adherents are bitterly divided about what lies beyond
our planet’s edges,131 but collectively the group is sizable
enough to host conferences,132 has some high-profile

129. See Ben Guarino, Neena Satija & Lena H. Sun, Deadly Measles Outbreak
Hits Children in Samoa After Anti-Vaccine Fears, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2019,
3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/11/26/deadly-measlesoutbreak-hits-children-samoa-after-anti-vaccine-fears/ (reporting on an outbreak
of thousands of measles cases in Samoa, leading to dozens of deaths, traced to
“anti-vaccine fears”).
130. See Tarpley Hitt, Jessica Biel Comes Out as Anti-Vaxx Activist, Joins
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to Lobby Against CA Vaccination Bill, DAILY BEAST (June
13, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/jessica-biel-comes-out-asanti-vaxx-activist-joins-robert-f-kennedy-jr-to-lobby-against-ca-vaccination-bill
(reporting that Jessica Biel has joined the anti-vax movement); Jordan Julian,
Comedian Rob Schneider Has Become Hollywood’s Loudest (and Wackiest) AntiVaxxer, DAILY BEAST (July 27, 2019, 4:10 AM), https://www.thedailybeast
.com/comedian-rob-schneider-has-become-hollywoods-loudest-and-wackiestanti-vaxxer (reporting that Rob Schneider has also joined the movement).
131. See Alan Burdick, Looking for Life on a Flat Earth, NEW YORKER (May 30,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/looking-for-life-on-a-flatearth (quoting flat-Earther Robbie Davidson as being “careful to note that the
conferences [he had been planning] are unaffiliated with the Flat Earth Society,
which, he said, promotes a model in which Earth is not a stationary plane, with
the sun, moon, and stars inside a dome, but a disk flying through space. ‘They
make it look incredibly ridiculous . . . . A flying pancake in space is
preposterous.’”).
132. See id.; see also, e.g., FLAT EARTH INT’L CONF., https://flatearth
conference.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (serving as the website for a flat-Earth
conference held in Dallas, Texas in November of 2019).
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supporters,133 and also maintains an Internet presence.134
The public implications of flat-Earther beliefs may be
difficult to assess, but they provide a basis for skepticism
about other claims with public policy significance as well.135
Additionally, it is worth noting that atypical
interpersonal manipulation can very well amount to
propaganda. For example, it is easy enough to generate
examples of propaganda being spread to an audience of one
in an informal or casual setting. Joseph Goebbels directed
Nazi propaganda efforts for years. Let us stipulate that many
of those efforts were manipulative in the sense defined above
in Section I.C.1. Imagine Goebbels engaging in a political
discussion with his wife’s friend at a dinner party, and
articulating the same messages he ordinarily directed
toward mass audiences through the Ministry of Public
Whether
his
Enlightenment
and
Propaganda.136
communications are created, disseminated, or actually
functioning as propaganda will depend, of course, on
unspecified details; but assume for the sake of argument that

133. See Sarah Valenzuela, History’s Most Famous Flat Earth Believers:
Athletes, Celebrities, and Ancient Greeks, NY DAILY NEWS (April 18, 2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/photos/nydn-history-s-most-famous-flatearth-believers-athletes-celebrities-and-ancient-greeks-20190418photogallery.html (identifying several celebrities who have expressed support for
the possibility that the Earth is flat).
134. See, e.g., FLAT EARTH INT’L CONF., supra note 132 (serving as the home
page for one of multiple flat-Earther groups).
135. See, e.g., Sam Kriss, Flat-Earthers Have a Wild New Theory About Forests,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/09/
flat-earth-truthers/499322/ (reporting on flat-earthers who believe that many of
the world’s trees are fake).
136. See Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Minister Ousted Over Remarks Echoing Nazi
Propaganda, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/brazil-minister-ousted-over-remarks-echoing-nazi-propaganda-1157928
8317 (noting that Goebbels was named Minister of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda in 1933). To help eliminate variables that could drive us to the right
result for the wrong reason, let us assume that some of the messaging Goebbels
issues in his professional capacity comes in the form of spoken words, rather than
exclusively in the form of posters or other media that cannot naturally be
replicated at a dinner party.
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Goebbels knows his arguments are manipulative and that
manipulating his audience is his intent. Surely it is
appropriate to say that his intent is to spread propaganda to
his guest.
We can even assume that the dinner party takes place
the night before Goebbels assumes his government post, so
that there is no confusion about whether the source is a
private person or a government agent. His statements will
nevertheless manifest greater persuasive power to the extent
they dovetail with, and can be bolstered by references to, a
broader ongoing campaign to advance similar propositions.
The more significant axis for charting this example, however,
is persuasive effect: if his statements concern (for example)
the threat posed to the state by certain minorities, the social
implications of that proposition being widely adopted are of
the utmost importance. Although this case may be atypical
as an example of the spread of propaganda, it is
simultaneously perfectly mundane as an example of
interpersonal interaction. Cases such as these account for
the possibility of someone spreading propaganda to small
audiences in casual conversation, which will most likely
arise when the claims at issue concern matters of public
significance and align with or advance a freestanding,
broader campaign around the same ideas.
Notice that the account of propaganda depicted in this
chart synthesizes the key lessons of the law of propaganda
and relevant scholarly discussions. First, this definition is
both objective and negative. Although the content of a
communication is not irrelevant to a determination of
whether a communication amounts to propaganda, for we
must assess the persuasive effect of the relevant propositions
advanced, the label can fairly and simultaneously be applied
to communications on either side of the same important
issue. Additionally, the preceding Section notes the scholarly
consensus about the need for manipulation to play a role, and
that is built into this chart and elaborated on in Section I.C.1.
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It is noteworthy, however, that the law reflects some
concern about manipulation as well. That concern manifests
most clearly in the FARA and the Smith-Mundt Act. The
FARA ensures that informational materials designed or
adapted to advance foreign interests could be viewed in the
United States only if their source and likely intent are clearly
identified. The worry is not that the messages advanced by
foreign governments are inherently harmful, but rather that
they would function to subvert Americans’ beliefs—that is,
they would be processed improperly from a rational
standpoint—if American audiences were not well aware of
the messages’ source. The worry makes sense from a
structural standpoint, as foreign entities disseminating
messaging in the United States are unlikely to do so with
American interests at heart. The same worry, albeit driven
by an inverted calculation, is implicit in the need for a
domestic dissemination ban under the Smith-Mundt Act:
messaging designed to advance American interests abroad,
perhaps by manipulating civilian populations, is not
necessarily simultaneously designed to inculcate true beliefs
in Americans themselves.
Persuasive power and persuasive effect explain a
number of the remaining features of scholarly and legal
views on propaganda. For one, some scholars identified
above have gravitated to the idea that propaganda must
typically target a mass audience.137 The account defended
here can explain that: intuitive criteria for propaganda
naturally correlate strongly with targeting mass audiences

137. MARLIN, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting and translating Jacques Ellul to
define “propaganda” as “a means of gaining power by the psychological
manipulation of groups or masses, or of using this power with the support of the
masses”); id. at 12 (offering his own definition of “propaganda” as “[t]he organized
attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in
a large audience in ways that circumvent or suppress an individual’s adequately
informed, rational, reflective judgment”); see also ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 476
(John Chamberlain, et al. eds., Reynal & Hitchcock 1941) (1925) (“Propaganda,
in its contents and form, has to be directed at the great masses and its efficiency
has to be measured exclusively by its effective success.”).
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both because propaganda concerns the shaping of peoples’
beliefs about matters of public concern and because more
sophisticated campaigns are larger, multi-pronged and only
justifiable from a cost standpoint if they reach large numbers
of people.
Somewhat similarly, diverse legal regulations of
propaganda underscore a deep (although not exclusive) focus
on regulating communications issuing from or on behalf of
governments. The international law domain naturally
focuses on actions by state governments, as states bear the
lion’s share of international legal duties. But the same
concern manifests in domestic law as well. The FARA
concerns itself primarily with the possibility of foreign
governmental messaging making its way into American
discourse without being recognized for its source. The
definition of “political propaganda” formerly codified in that
statute
explicitly
encompassed,
among
others,
communications that were intended to (or could reasonably
be expected to) “influence a recipient or any section of the
public within the United States with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations of a government or a
foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference
to the foreign policies of the United States.”138 Similarly, the
domestic dissemination ban that remained in effect for
decades under the Smith-Mundt Act focused on messaging
from the U.S. government specifically. And many one-off
references to propaganda in the U.S. Code point to foreign
governments in particular.139
The focus on governments tracks concerns about
persuasive power. The sophistication or power of a
communication depends first and foremost on its source, and
there is no source of information as powerful as a
government. Although governments vary in many ways, they

138. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 471–72 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (repealed 1995)).
139. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
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generally possess significant material resources to create
and disseminate communications for a variety of purposes;
unique access to massive amounts of proprietary data that
they collect and analyze—including information about their
audiences; a monopoly on the use of force against their
audiences (which entails a certain leverage to disseminate
information); and, in many cases, substantial credibility with
their audiences. Governments also have, and often use, the
power to suppress competing messages, and the ability to
mask the purpose for which they are disseminating
particular communications in the first place.140 And, to
further reinforce the point above, governments typically
address mass audiences with their messaging.
To the extent that the law associates propaganda with a
persuasive campaign undertaken by a non-governmental
entity—such as in the context of union elections—there is
once again a recognition of the power asymmetry between
the communicator and his or her audience, a key feature of
persuasive power. Although that asymmetry may be greatest
when comparing a government and its citizens, especially
wealthy corporate entities are also quite sophisticated. Like
governments, powerful corporations possess the capacity to
produce and widely disseminate effective communications to
an extent not shared by most members of their audiences.
News organizations, whether associated with powerful
corporations or otherwise, similarly acquire significant
persuasive power, especially as they grow in influence and
general credibility.
At the same time, the law reflects a concern about the
persuasive effect of certain communications—albeit,
interpreting “effect” as negative rather than significant. The
UN’s understandable and overriding concern with peace in
the late 1940s led it to approach propaganda in just this
140. In fact, government messaging contains so much inherent power and
sophistication as a general matter that, even when demonstrably false, their
persuasive power should still score outside the safe harbor arc near the origin in
the graph. See supra Table 1.
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functional manner, banning propaganda for war and
encouraging propaganda for peace. Similarly, the uses of
“propaganda” in the law to refer simply to unpopular or
dangerous ideologies suggests an understanding of
propaganda calibrated to its ultimate effects. The push to
remove the domestic dissemination ban in the Smith-Mundt
Act may also be explicable in this way, as a central
motivating factor behind it was the perceived need to
counteract the effects of extremist, anti-American
messaging. In other words, Congress deemed the subversive
potential of American government propaganda, when aimed
at Americans, less significant than (and possibly antidotal
to) the threat of extremist propaganda. The account provided
here captures that consistent legal concern but helpfully
channels it into an objective form.
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II. APPLYING THE COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF PROPAGANDA
TO CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICES
In addition to its ability to accommodate central legal
and
scholarly
concerns
about
propaganda,
the
comprehensive account offers us the power to classify and
analyze
a
number
of
troubling,
contemporary
communications practices of political significance. In doing
so, it frames the legal options for regulating propaganda
across numerous crucial contexts. This Part demonstrates
those features of the model.
A. Political gaslighting
One of the most notable features of the Trump
administration is its willingness to disseminate
demonstrably false information on a consistent and repeated
basis, for which some political commentators have adapted
the term “gaslighting.” The term “gaslighting” derives from
a movie entitled “Gaslight,” produced in the 1940s, in which
a man manipulates his spouse’s sense of sanity by
“dim[ming] and “brighten[ing] the gaslights and then
insist[ing] she is imagining it.”141 According to one scholar,
psychotherapists first adapted the term in the 1960’s for
analyzing “involuntary hospitalization as a form of abuse.”142
The term has traditionally been applied in the context of
interpersonal relationships, specifically where one
“manipulate[s another] by psychological means into
questioning [his or her] own sanity.”143 Gaslighting is
commonly understood to operate through the speaker’s use
of false statements, including his denial of true assertions by

141. Paige L. Sweet, The Sociology of Gaslighting, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 851, 851
(2019) (summarizing the film).
142. Id. at 853.
143. Gaslight, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/gaslight (last
visited July 30, 2020); see also Sweet, supra note 141, at 852 (“Despite the recent
journalistic use of gaslighting to name Trump’s political strategy, gaslighting is
traditionally understood as an interpersonal, psychological dynamic.”).
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another—at minimum with the effect (if not the specific
intention) of destabilizing his listener’s confidence in her
beliefs, or even her sense of reality.144
To the extent that the term connotes brazen dishonesty
with significant manipulative effect, there is no theoretical
reason for which it cannot be applied outside of interpersonal
settings.145 A powerful politician who routinely denies
evident propositions or embraces logical contradictions
without hesitation can wreak havoc on the public’s
relationship with its government, triggering doubts among
the people about their own recollections of settled matters of
historical fact, and inviting difficult questions about the

144. See Ariel Leve, Trump is Gaslighting America – Here’s How to Survive,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpis-gaslighting-america-heres-how-to-survive-2017-3 (“The term ‘gaslighting’
refers to when someone manipulates you into questioning and second-guessing
your reality.”). For more philosophical treatments of the concept, see Andrew
Spear, Epistemic Dimensions of Gaslighting: Peer-Disagreement, Self-Trust, and
Epistemic Justice, INQUIRY (Apr. 25, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.
2019.1610051 (defining gaslighting as arising “where one agent seeks to gain
control over another by undermining the other’s conception of herself as an
independent locus of judgment and deliberation”); Kate Abramson, Turning Up
the Lights on Gaslighting, 28 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (2014),
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12046 (defining gaslighting roughly as “a form of
emotional manipulation in which the gaslighter tries (consciously or not) to
induce in someone the sense that her reactions, perceptions, memories and/or
beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds—paradigmatically, so
unfounded as to qualify as crazy”); see also MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING (2007) (providing an account of
epistemic injustice that would seem to encompass gaslighting).
145. My definition of political gaslighting does not focus on the gaslighter’s
intentions so much as his brazenness and the effect of his dishonesty. There are
good reasons for this. Most notably, political figures speak to audiences with
whom they have little if any interpersonal connection, which necessarily modifies
the terms in which we can analyze their conduct. Nevertheless, the definition I
propose is arguably consistent with some of the philosophical underpinnings
identified by other theorists who are interested in intention. See supra note 144
(citing Spear and Abramson). For example, brazen dishonesty by a political
figure—dishonesty that is manifest and therefore causes dissonance and
destabilization in the audience—is very much an assertion of power over truth,
whatever motivates it specifically. Moreover, politicians will often be able to
convince at least a portion of their audience of the (possible) truth of
demonstrably false claims.
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mental state of the speaker. In fact, in the political context,
brazen dishonesty takes on a distinctive character because it
can be difficult to believe that a public figure would intend to
offer a demonstrably false statement to an audience so large
that a demonstration of the statement’s falsity is all but
assured. The destabilizing effect of such statements is only
magnified by the power asymmetry between the speaker and
his audience,146 reflecting the government’s inherent
persuasive power, as described above. Once again, this power
asymmetry manifests along numerous axes, including the
relative influence of the speaker and his audience, and the
speaker’s special access to information (such as government
intelligence) that could in some instances buttress or
undermine his claims.
Many have already endorsed the transfer of the term
“gaslighting” to the political context,147 though others remain

146. Power differentials are also arguably extremely important for
interpersonal gaslighting. See Sweet, supra note 141, at 852 (offering a
sociological theory of interpersonal gaslighting that recognizes the heightened
consequences of gaslighting efforts “when abusers mobilize macro-level
inequalities related to gender, sexuality, race, nationality, and class”).
147. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Kayleigh McEnany’s Latest Briefing is a Case Study
in Gaslighting, Whataboutism and False Claims, WASH. POST (May 26, 2020, 4:30
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/26/kayleigh-mcenanyslatest-briefing-is-case-study-gaslighting-whataboutism-false-claims/#click
=https://t.co/NIxpSExI8f (using “gaslighting” to describe the conduct of White
House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany); Dan Froomkin, Fact-Checking Needs
to Make Way for Reality-Testing and Gaslighting-Fighting, PRESS WATCH (Oct.
28, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://presswatchers.org/2019/10/fact-checking-needs-tomake-way-for-reality-testing-and-gaslighting-fighting/ (describing President
Trump as “engaged in gaslighting” when he tries “to make people doubt reality”);
Brian Hiatt, The Triumph of Stephen Colbert, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.rollingstone.com/tv/tv-features/stephen-colbert-late-show-rollingstone-interview-716439/ (quoting Stephen Colbert as saying: “The thing is that
you’re not crazy. . . . [Trump’s] gaslighting the audience. As a Catholic, I was
taught that the worst thing was heresy because not only are you sinning, you’re
also dragging somebody else into your sinful state. Well, Donald Trump is a
heretic against reality; he lives in this fantasy world where only his emotions
count and therefore only his reality is real.”) (alteration in original); Leve, supra
note 144 (transferring the term from the author’s personal relationships with her
mother and applying it to President Trump’s relationship with the American
public); Jennifer Mercica, When Trump Says He Was Being ‘Sarcastic,’ it’s Just
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skeptical.148 The structural similarity between gaslighting in
the interpersonal and political contexts is obvious in any
event, rendering the term apt for present purposes.
Moreover, my use of a modified version of the term in the
political context carries no particular implications for its
more traditional use—for example, to suggest anything
about the relative personal costs of political gaslighting and
Part of His Gaslighting, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2020, 6:06 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/25/when-trump-says-he-wasbeing-sarcastic-its-just-part-his-gaslighting/#click=https://t.co/SUFXTePqMz
(using “gaslighting” to describe President’s Trump’s pattern of explaining away
controversial remarks by claiming they were “sarcastic”); Eugene Robinson,
Trump Apparently Thinks He’s a Master at Gaslighting, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019,
5:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-apparently-thinkshes-a-master-at-gaslighting/2019/10/03/b87d192c-e60d-11e9-a6e8-8759c5c7f608
_story.html (claiming, in the context of impeachment proceedings, that “Trump
is trying to gaslight Americans by claiming, over and over again, that the
smoking-gun evidence against him was actually a ‘perfect’ phone call [with the
president of Ukraine]”); Stephanie Sarkis, Donald Trump is a Classic Gaslighter
in an Abusive Relationship with America, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/10/03/trump-classic-gaslighter-ab
usive-relationship-america-column/1445050002/ (analogizing President Trump
to an abusive partner, a “classic gaslighter in an abusive relationship with
America”); see also Sweet, supra note 141, at 851 (at least recognizing the current
usage if not endorsing it, noting that “[t]oday, gaslighting is an increasingly
ubiquitous term used to describe the mind-manipulating strategies of abusive
people, in both politics and interpersonal relationships”).
148. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf (@conor64), TWITTER, (Nov. 6, 2019, 6:11 PM),
https://twitter.com/conor64/status/1192218008321572866 (“Usage note: A lying
politician is not ‘gaslighting.’ The intent is not to make anyone question their
sanity. It is to put one over on supporters and undecideds.”). There are two
obvious difficulties with this position. First, it is impossible to make a sound
universal statement about the intentions of all chronically dishonest politicians,
and thus it is possible that some of them are in fact engaged in political
gaslighting even on Friedersdorf’s standard. Beyond that, even in interpersonal
contexts, I understand gaslighting to encompass repeated denial of true
propositions for any number of reasons, including the perceived self-interest of
the speaker—not necessarily for the specific purpose of, but at least incidentally,
causing the listener to doubt his or her sanity or sense of reality. Friedersdorf’s
usage does not appear to be the typical one, and it is in any event so narrow as to
be both extremely difficult to diagnose and extremely rare. A broader definition
of the sort utilized here is both increasingly well accepted and analytically useful
for addressing a genuinely important political phenomenon. See, e.g., Leve, supra
note 144 (in which the author describes her own mother’s gaslighting without
ever attributing to her the specific intention of making the author question her
own sanity).
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gaslighting in the context of an abusive interpersonal
relationship.
I define political gaslighting as follows: trafficking in
dubious or outright false information about matters of public
significance by a politician or political apparatus when the
speaker knows or should reasonably know that the
information is likely to be incorrect, and the audience has a
reasonable basis for doubting the speaker’s claims.
“Trafficking” encompasses both direct assertions and the
implied endorsement of propositions that are dubious or
outright false. A political gaslighter might rely explicitly on,
or collectively endorse, demonstrably incorrect propositions
and logical contradictions. In those cases, his political
gaslighting is overt—that is, it can be demonstrated beyond
question that the statements are erroneous in such a way
that the speaker should at minimum know they are false.
At other times, political gaslighting may be covert,
namely when a speaker makes statements that cannot be
conclusively proven false, but which the audience has a
reasonable basis to doubt. For example, a speaker may
misrepresent his own personal views or beliefs—say, stating
a basis for supporting a particular policy that he knows to be
untrue. We might describe such a figure as operating in bad
faith, articulating views he knows to be false in a context
where he also knows it will be difficult or impossible to prove
that he is lying.149 Misrepresentations of the speaker’s own
state of mind are thus among the more pernicious forms of
political gaslighting (a matter explored further below), and
not just because a politician’s state of mind often carries
significant social consequences.150

149. Overt political gaslighting may also manifest a form of bad faith, but it
has a somewhat different character, as explored further below.
150. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Mueller Secrets Would Help Determine
Whether Trump Lied, Democrats Tell Court, POLITICO, (Nov. 18, 2019, 2:36 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/18/mueller-secrets-trump-democratscourt-071378 (quoting Democratic House Representative Jamie Raskin on the
difference between President Trump inadvertently providing inaccurate
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Requiring the audience to have a reasonable basis for
doubting the speaker’s claims ensures that political
gaslighting is sufficiently similar to interpersonal
gaslighting to warrant transferring the term. The stronger
the basis for the audience’s skepticism of the politician’s
claims, the stronger that similarity will be. This is because
the audience will be more likely to question reality, or to be
torn between crediting propositions they believe with
confidence and crediting contrary representations from a
prominent and noteworthy source (the politician). Lies that
provide no basis for audience skepticism—undetected or
functionally undetectable lies—are not gaslighting.
Additionally, sporadic or stand-alone incorrect statements
are less likely to reflect political gaslighting unless they are
especially significant and brazen (that is, unless the basis for
audience skepticism is particularly strong). Propositions that
are genuinely and meaningfully contested do not by
themselves amount to gaslighting, though contested claims
may take on a different character or may be appropriately
analyzed less charitably when issued by officials who
consistently stand by more brazen or clearly erroneous
misstatements.
This definition of “political gaslighting” does not require
that qualifying speakers intend specifically to make listeners
doubt their own sanity; it does, however, require them to be
engaged in the trafficking of misinformation recklessly if not
knowingly, and with the suggestion that the information is
or could well be true. Mere indifference to the truth is no
defense to an allegation of political gaslighting, though
genuine cognitive limitations could be if they morally excuse
one from failing to distinguish fact from fiction. Of course,
certain misinformation is easier to spread recklessly than

information to Special Counsel Robert Mueller and President Trump doing so
deliberately: “[I]t’s a crime to lie to federal prosecutors in the course of a federal
proceeding . . . . That’s perjury. It was also the basis for the GOP-controlled
House’s impeachment of Bill Clinton for lying under oath, for committing
perjury.”).
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knowingly. The basis on which one endorses a particular
policy or the details of one’s own personal experience, for
example, are likely to be known directly by a speaker.
Typically, therefore, they will be misstated or denied
knowingly, not recklessly. By contrast, more remote factual
propositions, such as historical employment statistics or the
states of mind of people other than the speaker, more
naturally conduce to reckless (rather than knowing)
misrepresentation. It is certainly possible to misrepresent
such propositions knowingly as well, but it may be more
difficult to ascribe to the speaker the higher level of intent.
Put another way, in precisely calibrating the appropriate
moral response to political gaslighting, there may at times
be a minor but meaningful distinction between facts to which
the speaker has direct access and those to which he has
indirect access. It may also be true that, in assessing the
moral deficiencies of a political gaslighter, it makes a
difference whether he engages in the practice intentionally
or simply with reckless disregard for the truth; and that
seems a tricky matter, for it is notoriously difficult to discern
another’s state of mind. However, given the self-evident
obligations of governments to keep their citizens accurately
informed (subject only to limited and narrow exceptions),151
I will presume without argument that even a government
official’s reckless disregard for the widespread dissemination
of misinformation is seriously problematic from a moral
standpoint.152
For the purposes of the following analysis, it is also
helpful further to distinguish two types of political
gaslighting, both of which may be undertaken either covertly
or overtly. The first type involves the promotion of
sufficiently clear or copious misinformation about a
151. The need for the government to classify certain information is one salient
exception.
152. I also presume that a person immune from accusations of gaslighting due
to his cognitive inability to separate truth from falsehood will typically be unfit
to hold most (if not all) public offices.
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particular subject or topic, such as a politician’s putative
efforts to keep a particular campaign promise, or his
statements in response to a specific allegation of misconduct.
We may call this “thematic political gaslighting.” The second
type describes the consistent or habitual promotion of false
propositions that are unrelated to each other in substance,
as when a politician routinely expresses false statements on
a variety of matters because (for example) doing so is selfserving. I will refer to this as “indiscriminate political
gaslighting.” The two categories are not mutually exclusive.
For example, for reasons explained below, President Trump
engages in overt, indiscriminate political gaslighting that
can be subdivided into different thematic categories. A
generally honest politician—that is, one who does not engage
in indiscriminate political gaslighting—could, however,
engage in thematic gaslighting about a specific issue.153
It is likely impossible to set a precise quantitative
threshold for the number or collective weight of the false or
misleading
statements
necessary
to
qualify
as
“indiscriminate political gaslighting,” but it is also
unnecessary. Acknowledging and naming the phenomenon is
more important at this stage than defining the precise
boundaries. A direct, demonstrable lie about a specific point
may be enough to qualify as thematic political gaslighting,
whereas a more pronounced pattern of information on
discrete subjects will be necessary to qualify as
indiscriminate political gaslighting. The question is whether
the extent or directness of the misrepresentation functions to
undermine manifest or likely reality. Ultimately, the virtue
of identifying political gaslighting as a phenomenon is to
create a theoretical category for analyzing situations where
political forces contradict the truth so blatantly or

153. Sweeping and general denials of facts (rather than a wide array of specific
denials) can also reflect indiscriminate political gaslighting. See, e.g., Froomkin,
supra note 147 (providing video of President Trump telling an audience at a
Veterans of Foreign Wars convention: “What you’re seeing and what you’re
reading is not what’s happening.”).
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pervasively (even on specific points) that “reality itself is cast
into doubt,” as a result of which “[w]e can’t agree on truth.”154
On any number of metrics—moral, practical, historical—
political gaslighting is categorically different from the
intermittent (often good-faith) use of questionable claims,
which is understandably common among political figures
whose roles frequently demand unrehearsed and
extemporaneous public remarks.
1. President Trump’s overt political gaslighting
Under the definition adopted above, and barring an
undisclosed cognitive limitation of the relevant sort,155
President Trump is an overt, indiscriminate political
gaslighter.156 He routinely states and restates propositions
that are demonstrably false.157 Even his most brazen

154. JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS 57 (2018).
155. I have no special insight into President Trump’s mental states and do not
make any assumptions about the existence of undisclosed cognitive limitations.
As noted above, someone who literally lacks the ability to distinguish truth and
falsity would be unsuited for high office.
156. This Article makes no assertions about historical patterns of gaslighting
across politicians of different political parties, and the analysis provided here
does not turn in any way on whether politicians from one party are more likely
to engage in the practice than politicians of another. But the impetus for
conducting the following analysis is that President Trump and many of the
officials around him consistently engage in political gaslighting—not just
thematically, but indiscriminately. The phenomenon is so pronounced that it has
arguably begun to reshape the practice of journalism itself. See Alex Pareene,
How Political Fact-Checkers Distort the Truth, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/amp/article/156039/political-fact-checkers-distorttruth?__twitter_impression=true (arguing that in recent years “fact-checkers
have expanded their purview from checking strictly empirical statements to
‘checking’ contestable political statements,” and that such a shift “serves the
interests of power” in the current era). I will therefore utilize examples of
President Trump’s gaslighting to motivate the following analysis. Readers who
harbor greater concerns about apparent gaslighting by politicians of other
political stripes are welcome to substitute their own examples for the purposes of
engaging with the theoretical framework presented here.
157. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Trump’s Very Inaccurate Claim That the
Whistleblower is ‘Very Inaccurate,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/09/trumps-very-inaccurateclaim-whistleblower-is-very-inaccurate/ (identifying numerous false statements
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misrepresentations cut across a significant variety of
subjects, including the state of the economy,158 the results of
political polls159 and elections,160 the activities of his political
opponents,161 the effects of any number of his

President Trump has made about the whistleblower complaint at the center of
his impeachment proceedings and about the related matter of one of the
president’s phone calls with the president of Ukraine, and providing links to the
whistleblower complaint and the White House’s own summary of the relevant
call, which illustrate that those claims are false).
158. See Glenn Kessler, President Trump’s Repeated Claim: ‘The Greatest
Economy in the History of our Country,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/president-trumpsrepeated-claim-greatest-economy-history-our-country/ (collecting numerous
demonstrably false statements made by President Trump about the state of the
U.S. economy).
159. See Philip Bump, In Back-to-Back Tweets, Trump Shares a Fake Poll
Number and Dismisses a Real Poll Number as Fake, WASH. POST (May 22, 2020,
11:47 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/22/back-to-backtweets-trump-shares-fake-poll-number-dismisses-real-poll-number-fake/
(reporting that, “[f]or more than a year, Trump’s just occasionally shared random
assessments of his popularity within his party, never offering any explanation for
where the figure came from”); Sean Collins, Trump Cites Fake Polls to Make the
Case That Support for Impeachment is Falling, VOX (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/25/20981672/trump-impeach
ment-polls-support-decreasing (reporting that no known polls supported
President Trump’s statements about the purported unpopularity of impeachment
proceedings against him when in fact public polling had consistently shown a
much stronger level of support); Aaron Rupar, Trump’s Approval Rating is Strong
with Republicans. He Exaggerates it Anyway, VOX (Sept. 9, 2019, 11:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/9/20856738/trump-94-percentrepublican-approval-lie (documenting several of President Trump’s false
statements about polls that showed his level of support among Republicans).
160. See Mary Papenfuss, Trump’s Baseless Election Fraud Claim Zooms From
3 Million to 16 Million Votes, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:53 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-fake-vote-fraud-16-million_n_5d5b27aee
4b0d1e11366c6ab (reporting on President Trump’s false claims that between
three and 16 million fraudulent votes were cast for Hillary Clinton in the 2016
presidential election).
161. See Jeremy Stahl, Trump Falsely Claims Four Congresswomen Used the
Slur “Evil Jews,” SLATE (July 19, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/07/trump-falsely-claims-aoc-omar-tlaib-pressley-said-eviljews.html (detailing and debunking President Trump’s repeated statements that
several Democratic congresswomen had called Americans “garbage” and Jews
“evil”).
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administration’s policies,162 the progress his administration
has made in fulfilling campaign promises,163 the
achievements of his family and staff,164 his own behavior,165
the expressions of gratitude he receives for his leadership,166
162. See Ryan Bort, Trump’s Most Blatant Lie is His Lie About Tariffs, ROLLING
STONE (May 13, 2019, 11:06 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/trump-blatant-lies-tariffs-834548/ (documenting President Trump’s record
of false statements to the effect that China rather than domestic consumers and
businesses pay for tariffs he has imposed on Chinese goods); Glenn Kessler,
President Trump’s Tax Cut: Not ‘The Biggest’ in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Nov.
1, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/
11/01/president-trumps-tax-cut-not-the-biggest-in-u-s-history/?arc404=true
(documenting President Trump’s false assertions—made nearly 200 times—that
his tax cut was the biggest in U.S. history); Miriam Valverdi, Donald Trump,
Again, Falsely Says Obama had Family Separation Policy, POLITIFACT (June 21,
2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2019/jun/21/donaldtrump/donald-trump-again-falsely-says-obama-had-family-s/
(reporting
on
President Trump’s false statements that he was reuniting families that tried to
cross the southern U.S. border and that President Obama had actually instituted
a family separation policy at the border when in fact the reverse is the case).
163. See Glenn Kessler, President Trump Says his ‘Beautiful Wall’ is Being
Built. Nope., WASH. POST (April 5, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/04/05/president-trump-says-his-beautiful-wallis-being-built-nope/?arc404=true (documenting a range of false statements
President Trump has made about progress to fulfill his promise of building a wall
on the U.S. border with Mexico).
164. See Aaron Rupar, Trump Just Claimed Ivanka Created 14 Million Jobs.
The Entire Economy Added 6 Million, VOX (Dec. 12, 2019, 12:41 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/11/12/20961764/trump-ivanka-created-14-millionjobs-whopper (debunking President Trump’s claim that his daughter and advisor,
Ivanka Trump, personally created 14 million jobs).
165. Compare Donald Trump, Remarks at the 2019 Conservative Political
Action
Conference, WHITE HOUSE
(Mar.
3,
2019,
12:17
PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump2019-conservative-political-action-conference/ (in which President Trump made
false representations about the setting in which, and demeanor with which, he
requested Russian assistance in locating Hillary Clinton’s emails during the 2016
campaign), with Ashley Parker & David E. Sanger, Donald Trump Calls on
Russia to Find Hillary Clinton’s Missing Emails, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clintonemails.html?auth=login-email&login=email (showing the setting and President
Trump’s actual demeanor).
166. See Daniel Dale (@ddale8), TWITTER (Feb. 23, 2020, 11:53 AM),
https://twitter.com/ddale8/status/1231624222763556866?s=20 (juxtaposing a
transcript of President Trump claiming that people standing behind him at a
particular event were crying with gratitude with a photograph of the event
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and even the weather.167 A particularly important subject on
which President Trump has made dishonest statements is
COVID-19.168 In fact, according to the Washington Post’s
Fact Checker, President Trump made, on average, nearly 16
showing no such thing).
167. See Veronica Stracqualursi, Washington Post: Trump was the One who
Altered Dorian Trajectory Map with Sharpie, CNN (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/06/politics/trump-sharpie-hurricane-dorianalabama/index.html (reporting that, using a Sharpie marker, Trump personally
altered an official National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration map of the
projected path of Hurricane Dorian, rendering the map inaccurate but in
conformity with his earlier representations that the State of Alabama was in
danger from the storm).
168. See Daniel Dale & Tara Subramaniam, Trump Made 33 False Claims
About the Coronavirus Crisis in the First Two Weeks of March, CNN (Mar. 22,
2020, 6:59 PM), https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2020/03/22/politics/fact-check-trumpcoronavirus-false-claims-march/index.html?__twitter_impression=true
(detailing “33 false claims about the coronavirus crisis [made by President
Trump] in the first two weeks of March”); Greg Kessler, Meg Kelly & Sarah
Cahlan, Tracking Trump’s False or Misleading Coronavirus Claims, WASH. POST
(Mar. 14, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/14/
tracking-trumps-false-or-misleading-coronavirus-claims/#click=https://t.co/F8U
M6AknIi (collecting COVID-19-related Washington Post fact-checks of President
Trump on a single page); Linda Qiu, Analyzing the Patterns in Trump’s
Falsehoods
About
Coronavirus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-factcheck.ht
ml#click=https://t.co/2mFYVvMoSs (“For months, the president has downplayed
the severity of the pandemic, overstated the impact of his policies and potential
treatments, blamed others and tried to rewrite the history of his response.”); Gino
Spocchia, Video emerges showing Trump talking about cutting pandemic team in
2018, despite saying last week ‘I didn’t know about it,’ INDEPENDENT,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/coronavirusvideo-trump-pandemic-team-cut-2018-a9405191.html (last visited July 30, 2020)
(“A video has emerged of Donald Trump talking about cutting the US pandemic
response team in 2018 – days after claiming that he knew nothing about the
disbanded White House unit.”); 2020 Time Capsule, ATLANTIC, https://
www.theatlantic.com/notes/2020/03/2020-time-capsule-4/608197/ (last updated
Mar. 17, 2020) (documenting a number of President Trump’s false statements
related to COVID-19 under the heading “Trump is Lying, Blatantly”); see also
Mercica, supra note 147 (analyzing President Trump’s claims that he was merely
being “sarcastic” when, during a COVID-19 briefing, he suggested that a possible
treatment for the virus might include injecting oneself with disinfectant). Many
of these statements have been amplified by conservative media. See Philip Bump,
For Weeks, Conservative Media Joined Trump in Downplaying the Threat of the
Coronavirus,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
12,
2020,
12:04
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/12/weeks-conservative-mediajoined-trump-downplaying-threat-coronavirus/#click=https://t.co/JxFvQgeGaX.
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false or misleading statements per day for the first three and
a half years of his presidency, accumulating over 20,000 such
statements midway through the final year of his (initial)
term.169 The common theme uniting these statements may
simply be the perceived self-interest in advancing them, but,
whatever the motive, his gaslighting is copious and wideranging enough to be considered indiscriminate, even as
many of his misstatements can be clustered around
particular themes or topics.170
169. See Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo & Meg Kelly, President Trump Has
Made More Than 20,000 False or Misleading Claims, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020,
3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/13/president-trumphas-made-more-than-20000-false-or-misleading-claims/#click=https://t.co/RG
37j739bh (documenting 20,055 false statements by President Trump in his first
1,267 days in office). The Washington Post fact-checking staff has even assembled
a book dedicated to cataloging and debunking many of the statements that they
have identified as false. See GLENN KESSLER, SALVADOR RIZZO & MEG KELLY,
DONALD TRUMP AND HIS ASSAULT ON TRUTH (2020); see also Michael Gerson,
Trump is the King of Lies, WASH. POST (July 23, 2020,4:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-the-king-of-lies/2020/07/23/
b9a52fb0-cd02-11ea-91f1-28aca4d833a0_story.html#click=https://t.co/XXoAr6N
qRR (in which a former speechwriter for President George W. Bush describes
President Trump as “a bold, intentional liar, by any moral definition. A habitual
liar. A blatant liar. An instinctual liar. A reckless liar. An ignorant liar. A
pathological liar. A hopeless liar. A gratuitous liar. A malevolent liar.”); Peter
Wehner, Trump Has Made Alternative Facts a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/opinion/trump-has-made-alternat
ive-facts-a-way-of-life.html#click=https://t.co/BZZfm5fC40 (featuring another
former speechwriter for President George W. Bush claiming that President
Trump’s “goal [in making so many untrue statements is] to annihilate the
distinction between truth and falsity”).
170. Many of President Trump’s false statements appear on Twitter, which
generated controversy by beginning to apply tags to some of the president’s
tweets (approximately three years after he took office) to indicate that they are
false. See Kate Conger & Davery Alba, Twitter Refutes Inaccuracies in Trump’s
Tweets About Mail-In Voting, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/26/technology/twitter-trump-mail-in-ballots.html (last updated May 28,
2020). Twitter has also designated one of President Trump’s tweets as glorifying
violence and tagged videos circulated by the president as constituting
“manipulated media.” See Devey Alba, Kate Conger & Raymond Zhong, Twitter
Adds Warnings to Trump and White House Tweets, Fueling Tensions, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/technology/trump-twitter-minneapolisgeorge-floyd.html (last updated June 3, 2020); infra note 203. Twitter’s
application of those labels has not been entirely consistent, however. See Linda
Qiu, Hey @jack, Here Are More Questionable Tweets From @realdonaldtrump,
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We should acknowledge that fact-checking may at times
involve subjective or contested judgments, and we need not
assume that the Washington Post’s tally is perfect. In fact,
we can presume that it is generally wrong and still arrive at
the same effective result. Let us suppose for the sake of
argument that the fact-checker’s analysis is unduly harsh.
Let us suppose instead that President Trump has recklessly
or knowingly made, on average, one seriously misleading or
outright false public statement per day over the course of his
presidency, ranging across the sorts of categories identified
above.171 This assumption discounts the Washington Post
tally by over 90%. Even with such drastically reduced
numbers, President Trump would unequivocally qualify as
an indiscriminate political gaslighter on my definition. If the
public could expect one material misrepresentation per day
from the leader of its government, ranging across numerous
subjects, that would be more than sufficient reasonably to
rattle public trust and create a surreal environment in which
false claims issued from the most authoritative office in the
land routinely intermingle with the truth.
Overt political gaslighting is dangerous for several
reasons. It undermines the credibility of a government
official or agency, or even the government as a whole. It is
also inconsistent with public officials’ duties to the public to
execute their responsibilities in good faith. But most
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/politics/trump-twitter-factcheck.html (last updated June 10, 2020). In one particularly dramatic example,
President Trump shared a video “showing a group of doctors making misleading
and false claims about the coronavirus pandemic.” Rachel Lerman, Katie
Shepherd & Taylor Telford, Twitter Penalizes Donald Trump Jr. for Posting
Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST
(July 28, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/
trump-coronavirus-misinformation-twitter/?hpid=hp_morning-mix-8-12rr1_mm-trump%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans. Twitter then deleted the video
(following Facebook and Youtube, which had done the same), including by
removing several of the president’s tweets. Id. The video contains claims that
violated Twitter’s “covid-19 misinformation policy,” and contradicted claims from
the CDC, the WHO, and the FDA. See id. The video received millions of views
before its removal, however. Id.
171. See supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
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obviously, it requires the spread of misinformation, which
raises questions about whether and when it constitutes
propaganda (in the negative, objective sense discussed in this
Article). Without the comprehensive account developed
above, it might seem that indiscriminate political gaslighting
is not the sort of phenomenon that rises to the level of
propaganda. It may appear too unorganized, for example—
either because it lacks a unifying topical theme or because it
could reflect a lack of specific intention or coordinated
planning by the speaker.
The comprehensive account illustrates why that
conclusion would be mistaken. Overt, indiscriminate
political gaslighting generally should be regarded as
propaganda, and there is value in categorizing it as such to
help identify why it is so intuitively troubling. It reflects a
core case of manipulation as to content, inserting false
propositions (or casting doubt on true ones) with at least the
significant propensity to interfere with the audience’s ability
to process true information rationally. Political gaslighting
may also manipulate an audience as to confidence as well,
especially when the false information advanced inaccurately
conveys information about a source of yet further
information (such as the appropriate level of confidence one
should take in objective news reporting).
It is true that deliberately making demonstrably false
statements amounts to trafficking in the simplest sorts of
lies. Refuting such statements may require nothing more
than pointing to other sources—perhaps widely-available
and well-known sources, or even a single source. That is why,
on the chart above, it receives a lower score for persuasive
power than a more nuanced governmental messaging
campaign.172
172. Perhaps this is also why Jason Stanley categorizes certain forms of lying
as different from propaganda. According to Stanley:
Lying too is a betrayal of the rational will. But it is a different kind of
betrayal of the rational will than propaganda. At least with lying, one
purports to provide evidence. Propaganda is worse than that. It attempts
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But other factors countervail against this apparent lack
of sophistication, ensuring that its persuasive power remains
significant. Most notably, the communicating party is by
definition quite sophisticated—and potentially extremely so,
as in the case of the U.S. federal government. President
Trump has an audience of tens of millions on Twitter,173 and
millions more who see him routinely on television. In part
because of his office, and because of the effects of
partisanship on reasoning and belief-formation,174 he also
has credibility by default with a significant segment of that
large group. Further, when political gaslighting is as
indiscriminate and pervasive as it has been under the
current administration, the sheer extent of the
misinformation injected into the public sphere can
overwhelm even an engaged observer such that even some of
the most easily falsifiable statements may not be recognized
as such. Thus, the inherent lack of nuance that characterizes
pervasive, indiscriminate political gaslighting may not limit
its persuasive power as much as it would in the case of more
isolated, thematic political gaslighting.
Significant persuasive effect is also baked into our
definition of “political gaslighting” above: by limiting
ourselves to misstatements of social significance by political
figures or apparatuses, we narrow the phenomenon to
to unify opinion without attempting to appeal to our rational will at all.
It bypasses any sense of autonomous decision.
STANLEY, PROPAGANDA, supra note 11, at 48–49. Not all lying, of course, involves
providing evidence, though in many cases the lie itself may simply operate as a
false premise in one’s internal deliberative process. To the extent that lying
functions to manipulate an audience in the sense defined above, however, I
maintain that it can anchor propaganda.
173. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (last visited July 30, 2020) (noting 84.3 million followers).
174. See Jay J. Van Bavel & Andrea Pereira, The Partisan Brain: An IdentityBased Model of Political Belief, 22 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIENCE 213, 213 (2018),
http://www.psych.nyu.edu/vanbavel/lab/documents/VanBavel.etal.2018.TiCS.pd
f (noting that “there is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated
political reasoning” and that “recent research suggests that partisanship can
[also] alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments”).
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matters that score high on the y-axis of the chart above. The
persuasive effect of political gaslighting will depend on the
specific statement in question, but one consequence of overt,
indiscriminate political gaslighting is to shake the confidence
of the public in the government itself, which is also a matter
of massive public concern.
Finally, one might wonder if a sufficiently dishonest
politician might erode his own persuasive power to the point
where his gaslighting falls short of propaganda, or, similarly,
whether his extreme pattern of dishonesty might simply set
the context for his statements such that his audience expects
dishonesty and his statements cease to be manipulative in a
qualifying sense. The former is unlikely; a dishonest
government official will typically retain persuasive power
simply in virtue of the myriad communications resources he
has at his disposal. That is particularly true when abundant
sympathetic media magnify his claims.175 The latter is at
least theoretically possible, but it has not occurred yet (for
example) with President Trump, whose statements continue
to carry weight with millions of Americans, including a
significant minority of whom regard him as generally
trustworthy.176
2. Covert political gaslighting
As noted above, the defining feature of covert political
gaslighting is not that it goes undetected, but rather that it
cannot be proven conclusively, giving the speaker access to

175. See Lerman, Shepherd & Telford, supra note 170 (reporting on Twitter’s
deletion of a viral video containing falsehoods about COVID-19, which had been
tweeted out by President Trump and circulated widely by other groups, including
Breitbart News, the Tea Party Patriots, and America’s Frontline Doctors).
176. See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Trump Trails Biden by Widest National Polling
Gap
in
Decades,
U.S.
NEWS
(July
15,
2020,
5:42
PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-07-15/trump-trails-bidenby-widest-national-polling-gap-in-decades (reporting on a poll of the 2020
presidential race that the pollster described as having “no upside, no silver lining,
no encouraging trend hidden somewhere . . . for the president” but nevertheless
showing that 31% of respondents regard President Trump as “honest”).
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some measure of deniability. Covert political gaslighting
typically occurs when a speaker makes claims about a matter
that few if any others have the requisite access to falsify,
such as the speaker’s own attitudes and beliefs, or some sort
of proprietary or classified information. If contradictory
information becomes public, for whatever reason, then we
can describe it as a proven case of covert political gaslighting
rather than a purported or suspected case.
Covert political gaslighting can manipulate audiences
both as to content and as to confidence. For example, imagine
a politician misrepresenting his basis for supporting a
decision to channel taxpayer funds to bail out the automobile
industry. He states that he supports doing so because he
believes it is essential to the economy as a whole, but he in
fact supports the move primarily because he receives
substantial financial support from automakers. In some
instances, it will be relatively easy to discern the facts that
would ground an ulterior motive, but that is not always the
case. The self-serving reason for which he favors the policy
in question is relevant to the public’s understanding of the
importance of his position. In this case, he seeks to
manipulate his audience as to the contents of their beliefs
about his motivation, as a result of which they stand to be
manipulated as to the confidence they should take in the
proposition that propping up the auto industry is good for the
economy as a whole. Even if the politician would support the
auto industry absent its reciprocal support for him, that
counterfactual is not reasonably accessible to the public; the
actual fact of the industry’s support for the politician
(assumed for this example) provides a basis for discounting
his views to some extent.
More colorful examples exist in reality. For example, in
January of 1998, nearly a year before his impeachment for
perjury and obstruction of justice,177 President Bill Clinton

177. See Louis Jacobson, How the Impeachment Articles Against Trump are
Similar to, and Different From, Clinton and Nixon, POLITIFACT (Dec. 10, 2019),
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infamously denied that he had engaged in a sexual
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, a former White House
intern: “I did not have sexual relations with that woman,
Miss Lewinsky.”178 Within months, he backed away from
that firm denial. When pressed in August of 1998 on whether
he had been truthful in affirming some version of that
statement—to the effect that “there is absolutely no sex of
any kind” with Lewinsky—President Clinton notoriously
replied, “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’
is.”179 He then formally acknowledged that he had engaged
in a sexual relationship with Lewinsky.180 Assuming there
was reasonable basis for doubting President Clinton’s initial
denial at the time he made it, his statement represented a
case of covert, thematic political gaslighting: he knowingly
misled the public about a specific and narrow matter, and his
audience was not in a position conclusively to falsify his
statement even as it had some evidence that he was being
untruthful. An ongoing investigation eventually brought
contradictory information to light that ultimately settled the
matter of his truthfulness.
In other purported cases of covert political gaslighting,
the speaker may continue to deny having misled his
audience, despite a manifest basis for skepticism about his

https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/dec/10/how-articlesimpeachment-against-trump-are-similar/ (describing both of the articles of
impeachment against President Clinton that the House of Representatives
approved in 1998).
178. See Bill Clinton: ‘I Did Not Have Sexual Relations with that Woman.,’
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018, 5:39 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
video/politics/bill-clinton-i-did-not-have-sexual-relations-with-that-woman/2018/
01/25/4a953c22-0221-11e8-86b9-8908743c79dd_video.html (providing the video
and date of President Clinton’s statement).
179. David A. Graham & Cullen Murphy, The Clinton Impeachment, as Told
by the People Who Lived It, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2018/12/clinton-impeachment/573940/.
180. Aug. 17, 1998: President Clinton Admits ‘Improper Relationship’ with
Monica Lewinsky, ABC NEWS (Aug. 17, 1998), https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/video/aug-17-1998-president-clinton-admits-improper-relationship57137291 (at 35 seconds).
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denials. For example, in 2016, Republican Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell refused to hold a confirmation vote
on Merrick Garland, President Obama’s nominee to fill the
late Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court.181
McConnell’s stated rationale was that the next president
should get to nominate a new justice; 2016 was an election
year and “the American people should have a say in the
court’s direction.”182 In 2019, however, McConnell addressed
how he would approach an open seat on the Court in 2020,
and, under a Republican president, he gave a different
answer: “Oh, we’d fill it.” Although McConnell has tried to
distinguish 2016 from 2020, noting in the latter year that the
Senate and the White House are controlled by the same
party,183 many believe the rationale he advanced in 2016 was
mere pretext.184 If it was, this would be a classic case of
covert political gaslighting.185
181. See Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why
it Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-whyit-matters-now.
182. Id.
183. See Ledyard King, ‘We’d Fill it:’ Mitch McConnell Blocked Obama
Supreme Court Pick but Says he’d Help Trump Fill a Vacancy, USA TODAY (May
29, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/29/
mcconnell-blocked-obama-supreme-court-choice-wouldnt-stop-trump/126888300
1/ (attributing a statement of that view to McConnell).
184. See Hillary Leung, ‘Oh, We’d Fill It.’ Mitch McConnell Says He’d Fill a
Supreme Court Vacancy in 2020, TIME (May 29, 2019), https://time.com/
5597395/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-2020/ (quoting Senate Minority Leader
Chuck Schumer as calling McConnell a “hypocrite” for adopting this stance); see
also, e.g., Aaron Rupar, McConnell Now Says He’d Hold SCOTUS Hearings in an
Election Year – In a Reversal of 2016, VOX (May 29, 2019, 10:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/5/29/18644061/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-courthearings-2020-merrick-garland (articulating the view that McConnell
misrepresented his basis for opposing a vote for Merrick Garland).
185. In the closest of cases, the difference between a later-proven or admitted
case of covert political gaslighting (such as in the Clinton example) and a highly
suspicious case of covert political gaslighting (such as in the McConnell example)
may be a matter of degree—a gradation in our level of confidence that the speaker
should know the propositions advanced to be false. Some might also think the
McConnell case has essentially been proven notwithstanding his public denials.
Regardless of precisely where we draw the line, there is a meaningful distinction
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Another common example of covert political gaslighting
can arise when a speaker sheds crocodile tears. Assuming
the matter in question is of sufficient public concern, and
there is good reason to doubt its sincerity, politicians engage
in covert political gaslighting when they express faux
outrage—for example, at an ostensible slight from their
political opponents. Feigned offense misrepresents their
commitment to the norms that their opponents ostensibly
violated, or at minimum their belief that their opponents
have violated such norms in the first place. In expressing it,
a speaker obscures from her audience the true explanation
for her outraged response (which may actually serve some
purely strategic function such as distraction) and knowingly
instills in some members of the public a false sense that a
genuine dispute of consequence exists when in fact it does
not. At the same time, the fake outrage contradicts a truth
other members of the public have reasonably ascertained
and forces them to reconcile the denials with the other
evidence at hand.186
in principle between admitted or functionally proven cases of covert political
gaslighting and those where some effective level of deniability remains in place.
See Graham & Murphy, supra note 179; King, supra note 183.
186. One recent purported case arose during the impeachment trial of
President Trump. See Li Zhou, Senate Republicans’ Disingenuous Outrage Over
Schiff’s “Head on a Pike” Comment, Briefly Explained, VOX (Jan. 25, 2020, 11:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/25/21071035/senate-republ
icans-adam-schiff-head-on-a-pike-comment-outrage (describing the outrage
expressed by Senate Republicans in response to a statement from House
Representative Adam Schiff that, “CBS News reported last night that a Trump
confidant said that key senators were warned, ‘Vote against the president and
your head will be on a pike . . . . I don’t know if that’s true. . . . I hope it’s not
true.”). For reasons unclear, some Republican Senators treated the comment as
an insult. See id. Others have analyzed White House Press Secretary Kayleigh
McEnany’s “scripted walk-offs”—her prepared replies and abrupt departures
from the press room following a question she does not like—in similar terms,
describing it as “political theater” that makes for a “pointed” or “dramatic exit[]”
and demonstrates her “disrespect” for the press. Paul Farhi, The Political Theater
of Kayleigh McEnany’s Scripted Walk-Offs, WASH. POST (July 3, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/the-political-theater-ofkayleigh-mcenanys-scripted-walk-offs/2020/07/02/a9b7d09a-ba41-11ea-bdafa129f921026f_story.html#click=https://t.co/eYv4pGtxaT. It is impossible to know
McEnany’s actual views of the matter, but the quoted analysis amounts, in
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Covert political gaslighting amounts to propaganda of a
particularly insidious sort because it cannot be falsified at
the time it is communicated, and might never be falsified at
all. Although its persuasive effect will depend on its contents
in any given case, its covert nature automatically increases
its persuasive power—in varying degrees, depending on the
surrounding circumstances—because it is immune to direct
falsification and subject at best to various forms of suspicion.
It may also be more likely to persuade some members of the
public as a result. In other words, because it is covert in the
relevant sense, it possesses greater potential to manipulate.
B. Other Contemporary Forms of Propaganda
Political gaslighting is a particularly salient problem but
it is only one form of propaganda. The model articulated
above has the power to identify and plot a variety of other
forms, many of which are tailored around the Internet—and,
in particular, social media use. One example is astroturfing,
the practice of attempting to “mislead the public, giving a
false impression that there is genuine grass-roots support or
opposition for a particular group or policy.”187 Whether
organized by governments, corporations, or private
individuals, astroturfing is manipulative in precisely the
way defined above. It obscures the true source of advocacy
and misrepresents the level of support for particular
propositions with the aim of inducing an audience to give the
campaign’s communications unwarranted weight.
essence, to an accusation that she is engaging in covert political gaslighting.
187. Franziska Keller, David Schoch, Sebastian Stier & JungHwan Yang, It’s
Not Easy to Spot Disinformation on Twitter. Here’s what we Learned from 8
Political ‘Astroturfing’ Campaigns., WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/28/its-not-easy-spot-disinform
ation-twitter-heres-what-we-learned-political-astroturfing-campaigns/. Notably,
Twitter policies reflect concerns about some forms of astroturfing; they prohibit
“platform manipulation,” which includes “inauthentic engagements, that attempt
to make accounts or content appear more popular or active than they are.”
Platform manipulation and spam policy, TWITTER (September 2019),
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation (last visited
Feb. 1, 2020).
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Astroturfing is an international phenomenon.
Campaigns originating in countries such as Russia, Egypt,
and the United Arab Emirates have utilized various social
media platforms to divide citizens abroad or cultivate
support for authoritarian governments.188 For example,
Russian trolls infamously posed both as conservative
Americans and as Black Lives Matter activists during the
2016 election to heighten conflict among actual American
voters.189 Domestic politicians and groups also undertake
astroturfing campaigns.190 Moreover, when others
uncritically endorse or disseminate messaging that
originates
with
such
campaigns,
they
spread
communications that will likely function as propaganda—
even if they do not realize the information is false.
Another common phenomenon that may rise to the level
of propaganda is the failure of purportedly neutral media
platforms to disclose germane information about their
contributors, whether those contributors serve as authors of
written pieces or guests on televised programs. For example,
188. See Keller, supra note 187.
189. Id. (briefly describing the role of Russian trolls in the 2016 election, as
documented in the Mueller Report).
190. See Maryl Kornfield, Twitter Suspends 70 Pro-Bloomberg Accounts for
Campaign’s Copy-and-Paste Strategy, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2020, 10:49 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/22/bloomberg-twittersuspensions/#click=https://t.co/mJuWRp05M6 (reporting that, during his
campaign for the presidency, 70 Twitter accounts coordinated by Mike Bloomberg
were suspended from Twitter for violating policies banning platform
manipulation. Those policies include a prohibition on “‘artificially amplify[ing] or
disrupt[ing] conversations through the use of multiple accounts’ or
compensat[ing] ‘others to engage in artificial engagement or amplification, even
if the people involved use only one account.’”); Isaac Stanley-Becker & Tony
Romm, Pro-Gun Activists Using Facebook Groups to Push Anti-Quarantine
Protests, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2020, 8:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/04/19/pro-gun-activists-using-facebook-groups-push-anti-quara
ntine-protests/?wpmk=1&wpisrc=al_news__alert-economy—alert-national&utm
_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=wp_news_alert_revere
(reporting that a “trio of far-right, pro-gun provocateurs is behind some of the
largest Facebook groups calling for anti-quarantine protests around the country,
offering the latest illustration that some seemingly organic demonstrations are
being engineered by a network of conservative activists”).

2020] LIES, GASLIGHTING AND PROPAGANDA

1111

the failure to identify contributors who stand to benefit in
direct and significant ways from some important policy lays
the groundwork for covert gaslighting about the speaker’s
motives for supporting that policy.191 Perhaps worse would
be the failure to note when contributors who express support
for government action are in fact paid by the government to
do so.192 Government agencies may run into this problem as
well, though in a slightly different form.193
Yet another prominent example of propaganda is the use
of euphemisms in contexts of public significance, such as
“enhanced interrogation” instead of “torture,”194 or “fireside

191. See Lee Fang, TV Pundits Praising Suleimani Assassination Neglect to
Disclose Ties to Arms Industry, INTERCEPT (Jan. 6, 2020, 6:25 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/01/06/iran-suleimani-tv-pundits-weaponsindustry/ (“Many of the pundits who appeared on national television or were
quoted in major publications to praise [the strike that killed Iranian Major
General Qassim Suleimani] have undisclosed ties to the defense industry[, which]
stands to gain from increased violence.”).
192. See Eli Clifton, U.S. Media Outlets Fail to Disclose U.S. Government Ties
of ‘Iranian Journalist’ Echoing Trump Talking Points, RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/01/06/u-s-media-outletsfail-to-disclose-u-s-government-ties-of-iranian-journalist-echoing-trump-talkingpoints/ (reporting that multiple news outlets described a particular contributor
brought on to discuss the Suleimani strike as an “Iranian journalist,” but
neglecting to mention that she is paid as an “anchor, writer, [and] reporter for
[Voice of America] Persian Service”—the U.S. government’s own foreign
messaging arm for shaping public opinion abroad).
193. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that federal
agencies may violate prohibitions on using public funds for propaganda purposes
when they create “unattributed prepackaged news stories” (also referred to as
“video news releases” or “VNRs”) that resemble independent news coverage. See
Video News Releases: Unattributed Prepackaged News Stories Violate Publicity
or Propaganda Prohibition, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (May 12, 2005),
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-643T. According to the GAO, “[w]hile
agencies generally have the right to disseminate information about their policies
and activities,” they “may not use appropriated funds to produce or distribute
prepackaged news stories intended to be viewed by television audiences that
conceal or do not clearly identify for the television viewing audience that the
agency was the source of those materials.” Id.
194. See Margot Williams, At Guantánamo Bay, Torture Apologists Take
Refuge in Empty Code Words and Euphemisms, INTERCEPT (Jan. 29, 2020, 6:00
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/01/29/guantanamo-9-11-forever-trials/
(describing testimony given by James Mitchell, the contractor who designed the
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chats” instead of “interrogations.”195 Euphemisms such as
these can manipulate audiences into being more or less
accepting of a practice or policy than warranted through
misidentification and misleading connotation. Other
practices include the creation or use of school textbooks that
betray a bias either for the information they include or the
information they omit;196 the use of newspaper headlines
that reproduce false information or imply false or misleading
conclusions when considered alone;197 the sharing or
endorsement of conspiracy theories;198 attributing incorrect
CIA’s torture program, and specifically focusing on the use of euphemisms to
sanitize the interrogators’ abusive conduct).
195. See Gitmo Watch (@GitmoWatch), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2020, 10:07 AM), h
ttps://twitter.com/gitmowatch/status/1221811918152904704?s=21 (live-tweeting
the testimony of James Mitchell and quoting Mitchell as describing interrogation
sessions with 9/11 defendant Khalid Shaikh Mohammad—undertaken at a CIA
black site and while Mohammad was naked—as “fireside chats”).
196. See Dana Goldstein, Two States. Eight Textbooks Two American Stories.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/12/us/
texas-vs-california-history-textbooks.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (documenting
how textbooks are “customized for students in different states” in a manner that
“reflect[s] the nation’s deepest partisan divides” even when the books “have the
same publisher [and] credit the same authors”). There may well be a defensible
range of inclusions or omissions on any particular subject in a textbook, but there
will also be cases that fall outside of that range and leave readers to draw
unsupported or false conclusions about matters of fact.
197. See U.K.H. Ecker, S. Lewandowsky, E.P. Chang & R. Pillai, The Effects of
Subtle Misinformation in News Headlines, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 323
(2014) (arguing that subtly misleading headlines can lead to false beliefs in
readers because “headlines constrain further information processing, biasing
readers toward a specific interpretation [and] readers struggle to update their
memory in order to correct initial misconceptions”).
198. See, e.g., Brandy Zadrozny and Ben Collins, Coronavirus Deniers Take
Aim at Hospitals as Pandemic Grows, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/amp/ncna1172336?__twitter_impression=true (last updated Mar. 31, 2020,
3:19 PM) (reporting on “coronavirus deniers” circulating videos that purported to
show relative calm conditions at various hospitals, ostensibly to suggest that
common, corroborated reports of shortages of medical resources for treating cases
of COVID-19 were in fact exaggerated); Brandon Zadrozny, Fire at ‘Pizzagate’
Shop Reignites Conspiracy Theorists who Find a Home on Facebook, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/firepizzagate-shop-reignites-conspiracy-theorists-who-find-home-facebook-n965956
(describing the “pizzagate” conspiracy theory, which led a man to fire his assault
rifle inside a D.C. restaurant that he falsely believed to be used for child

2020] LIES, GASLIGHTING AND PROPAGANDA

1113

or misleadingly selected quotes to a source;199 disseminating
or reporting on selective leaks of stolen or hacked
information—or leaking accurate information laced with
false information;200 and the circulation of doctored photos
and videos, whether as memes or otherwise.201
The last of these raises especially difficult challenges.
Photographs and videos have particular persuasive power
because they are often regarded as prima facie veridical; they
may not show much, depending on their angle and focus, but
what they show would typically be presumed to be a
snapshot of reality.202 By contrast, at least typically, written
trafficking).
199. See, e.g., Daniel Dale (@ddale8), TWITTER (Mar. 29, 2020, 2:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/ddale8/status/1244334820760707073?s=20 (comparing a
tweet from President Trump about the “ratings” for his COVID-19 briefings
(purportedly quoting the New York Times) with the actual language in the Times,
showing that President Trump’s tweet omits key qualifiers from the Times’s
report and lacks grammatical designations revealing that language is missing
from the quotation).
200. See, e.g., Thomas Brewster, Russian ‘Fancy Bear’ Hackers Tainted Their
Huge Data Leaks With Fake Data, FORBES (May 16, 2017, 9:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/26/russian-dnc-hackersplanted-leaks-with-fake-data/#16ee550a52ff.
201. See Drew Harwell, Doctored Images have Become a Fact of Life for
Political Campaigns. When They’re Disproved, Believers ‘Just don’t Care.,’ WASH.
POST (Jan. 14, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/01/14/doctored-political-images/?utm_campaign=wp_main&utm_medium
=social&utm_source=twitter (reporting that doctored images and videos of
political significance are becoming more common).
202. For this reason, manipulated photographs or videos are especially
powerful propaganda tools. See, e.g., Jim Brunner, Fox News Runs Digitally
Altered Images in Coverage of Seattle’s Protests, Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/fox-newsruns-digitally-altered-images-in-coverage-of-seattles-protests-capitol-hill-autono
mous-zone/?amp=1&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign
=article_inset_1.1&__twitter_impression=true (last updated June 14, 2020, 9:06
PM) (reporting that “Fox News published digitally altered and misleading photos
on stories about Seattle’s Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone”—”a mashup of photos
from different days” run without a disclaimer identifying it as such—before
apologizing.) The notion that Fox’s conduct in this instance amounted to “a clear
violation of ethical standards for news organizations” reflects our preconceptions
about photographs as veridical. Id. The effect of the mashup in this instance was
to make “the scenes look much more violent and destructive than they are.” Kate
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words or even images of other sorts (such as drawings or
paintings) by default reflect the subjective point of view of
their author or creator, even if it is a point of view that
purports to be neutral. Doctored photos or videos thus have
a special propensity to manipulate an audience because of
the background presumptions we tend to make specifically
about those forms of media.203
Riga, Fox News Manipulates Pictures Of Seattle Protests Then Lies About It, TPM
(June 13, 2020, 12:41 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/fox-newsseattle-protests-chaz; see also Aiden Pink, Republican Senator Deletes Ad That
Made Jewish Opponent’s Nose Bigger, FORWARD (July 27, 2020),
https://forward.com/news/national/451581/jon-ossoff-jewish-nose-david-perdueantisemitic/?gamp&__twitter_impression=true (reporting that Georgia Senator
David Perdue “deleted a Facebook ad targeting his Jewish election opponent, Jon
Ossoff, that appeared to have been altered to make Ossoff’s nose bigger” and
which also featured an image of another Jewish senator and the phrase
“Democrats are Trying to Buy Georgia!”). The manipulated photo, combined with
other features of the ad, are strongly suggestive of an intention to invoke
“antisemitic trope[s].” Id.
Leaving aside cases where they are subject to secret manipulation, the persuasive
effect of photographs and videos naturally turns in part on their contents.
Notably, communications featuring (even non-photographic) images or music
may also have a distinctive propensity to manipulate because they may carry
emotional appeals or incomplete rational appeals that lead to erroneous
conclusions of fact. See, e.g., Army Urges Young People Lacking Confidence to
Join, BBC (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50966542 (describing a
British military recruitment campaign that uses images to target young people
with low confidence). The argument implied by the recruitment posters—that one
can earn confidence that “last[s] a lifetime” by serving in the military, and
therefore that one should join—cannot possibly be valid in the technical sense
(meaning that the conclusion does not follow from the premises). See id.
(reproducing posters bearing that text). For the image to operate as intended, it
will have to persuade via some sort of shortcut, whether a logically questionable
suggestion or an emotional appeal. If the image has sufficient persuasive power
or effect, it will then qualify as propaganda.
203. See, e.g., David Klepper, Ethics Panel Warns House Members Not to Share
Fake Images, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/
0a4f3c716559775603d92c7340eeada0 (“The House Ethics Committee is warning
lawmakers not to share doctored images or videos that could ‘erode public trust,
effect (sic) public discourse, or sway an election,’ guidance that comes during a
proliferation of online misinformation in the run-up to the 2020 elections.”). In
fact, Twitter recently adopted a tag for “synthetic and manipulated media,” which
it applied “for the first time” to a “deceptively edited video of former vice president
Joe Biden” that was shared by President Trump. Cat Zakrzewski, Twitter Flags
Video Retweeted by President Trump as ‘Manipulated Media,’ WASH. POST (Mar.
9, 2020, 10:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/08/
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In all of these scenarios, clarity requires that we
maintain the distinctions identified above between the
purpose behind the creation or dissemination of a
communication and the manner in which it is likely to
function. Intentional manipulation, such as astroturfing,
aims for propagandistic effect; whether it functions as
propaganda in fact will depend simply on how successful it
is. Other phenomena, like the development and circulation
of unfounded conspiracy theories, may reflect the sincerelyheld views of the speaker. Such speech would not be intended
to manipulate at all; rather, it would aim to reveal a hidden
truth. But unfounded conspiracy theories threaten to
function inherently as propaganda—at least when they have
sufficient persuasive power or persuasive effect—because by
definition they misuse evidence or draw unwarranted
conclusions. Notably, regardless of the intentions behind the
creation or dissemination of particular communications,
platforms that circulate material with manipulative
propensity will often function as propaganda outlets.204
twitter-flags-video-retweeted-by-president-trump-manipulated-media/#click=
https://t.co/OQKEOJn1P1. The video truncates Biden’s remarks mid-sentence,
making it appear that Biden says, “We can only reelect Donald Trump.” Id. A full
clip of Biden’s remarks shows him stating, “We can only reelect Donald Trump if,
in fact, we get engaged in this circular firing squad. It’s got to be a positive
campaign, so join us.” Id. For more on the Twitter policy, see Synthetic and
Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/manipulated-media (last visited July 30, 2020). Twitter subsequently
applied the label to other tweets by President Trump. See Cat Zakrzewski,
Twitter Labels Trump Video Tweet as Manipulated Media as it Cracks Down on
Misinformation, WASH. POST (June 19, 2020, 6:35 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/18/trump-tweet-label-video/.
204. Facebook has faced this issue repeatedly. See Kevin Roose, Sheera
Frenkel & Mike Isaac, Don’t Tilt Scales Against Trump, Facebook Executive
Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/07/technology/facebook-trump-2020.html#click=https://t.co/VG3sGCEp5U
(describing an internal debate about relevant policies at Facebook, which
presently exempts “[p]osts by politicians” from “many of [its] current rules,” and
does not fact-check politicians’ political ads); see also Craig Timberg, How
Conservatives Learned to Wield Power Inside Facebook, WASH. POST (Feb. 20,
2020, 1:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/20/
facebook-republican-shift/#click=https://t.co/JU1teCpwfG (describing opposition
within Facebook to removing “dozens of pages that had peddled false news
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CONCLUSION
This Article offers both a step forward in our theorizing
about propaganda, and a first, systematic attempt at
theorizing about political gaslighting. Beyond its theoretical
contributions, the Article therefore sets the table for more
nuanced and consistent debates about how to regulate
propaganda in a variety of contexts. As illustrated above, to
the limited extent that the law has approached the subject of
regulating propaganda, it has done so erratically and
inconsistently. Moreover, some propaganda will be
impossible to regulate—and may be worth tolerating—in a
society that privileges freedom of expression as heavily as
our own does. But it is impossible to regulate propaganda, or
even choose whether we should, unless we know what it is.
And it is difficult to ascertain what amounts to propaganda
without distilling the lessons buried both in scholarly and
legal analysis, and without applying those lessons to modern
communications practices. This Article aims to make
advances on those fronts.

reports” ahead of the 2016 presidential election). According to the report,
“[n]early all of [the pages] were based overseas, had financial motives and
displayed a clear rightward bent” but high-level executives resisted removing
them all because doing so “will disproportionately affect conservatives,” who
“don’t believe it to be fake news.” Id. Notably, the project was called “Project P”
where the “P” stands for “propaganda.” Id.

